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Since 1975, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) has required public disclosures 
from most mortgage lending institutions with offices in metropolitan areas.  The release of 
the information, including the geographic location and other characteristics of the home 
mortgages lenders originate or purchase during a calendar year, is intended to help the public 
determine whether institutions are adequately serving their communities’ housing finance 
needs; it is also intended to facilitate enforcement of the nation’s fair lending laws and guide 
public- and private-sector investment activities.
     
For a calendar year, lenders covered by HMDA publicly release their loan data 
beginning on March 31 of the subsequent year; in the following September, the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) releases summary tables pertaining to 
each lender and lending activity in each metropolitan statistical area, along with a file 
consolidating virtually all the reported information.
1  The nearly 8,900 lenders currently 
covered by the law account for an estimated 80 percent of all home lending nationwide.  
Because of its expansive coverage, the HMDA data likely provide a broadly representative 
picture of home lending in the United States.  
                                                 
     Note: The authors would like to express their appreciation for the late Edward M. Gramlich, member 
of the Federal Reserve Board from November 1997 to August 2005.  His vision and persistence in seeking what 
became the 2002 amendments to the Board's HMDA regulations yielded the loan pricing information that has 
so enriched the value of the HMDA data. 
1 Between March and September, the FFIEC member agencies systematically check the data for errors 
or omissions.  To protect the identity of borrowers, the public data exclude the dates of loan applications and the 
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After briefly summarizing previously published assessments of the 2004 and 2005 
HMDA data and reviewing some prominent issues surrounding pricing in the mortgage 
market, this article analyzes the 2006 data.
2  As in the analyses of the previous two years, this 
review focuses primarily on the pricing information included in the HMDA data and 
differences observed across lending institutions, geographic areas, and population groups.  
The article concludes with an assessment of factors that account for the variation in rates of 
serious delinquency on mortgage loans across counties as of March 31, 2007, including 
information drawn from the HMDA data on the incidence of higher-priced lending and from 
a data file of credit scores by geographic area. 
Increases in market interest rates over the course of 2004 and 2005 were an important 
contributor to the substantial increase between those years in the reported incidence of 
higher-priced lending as measured by the HMDA data.  For the 2006 data, changes in market 
interest rates were more subdued, an aspect of the reported incidence of higher-priced 
lending for 2006 that will be discussed below.  The current disturbances in the subprime 
sector of the mortgage market emerged primarily in the later portions of 2006.  The effects of 
those disturbances and the associated changes in the regulatory environment will be reflected 
primarily in the HMDA data for 2007 and subsequent years.  
At the outset, HMDA disclosures were limited to summary totals covering loan 
extensions by type of loan for each census tract but included no information on loan pricing 
or applications for loans that were denied by the lender.  Over the years, the Congress has 
extended the reach of the law to a broader range of institutions and expanded the types of 
information that must be reported and disclosed.  The most sweeping of the legislative 
                                                 
2 Refer to Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook (2005), “New Information Reported 
under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 91 (Summer), 
pp. 344-94; and Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner (2006), “Higher-Priced Home 
Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 92 (September 8), pp. A123-66. 2006 HMDA Data  -3-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
amendments to HMDA, adopted in 1989, required disclosure of the disposition of 
applications for home loans and the income, sex, and race or ethnicity of the individuals 
applying for those loans.   
That new information prompted widespread public discussion about the fairness of 
mortgage lending decisions, as analyses of the disclosures revealed wide disparities in the 
rates of approval of loan applications across racial and ethnic lines.
3  Since the 1989 
amendments, the HMDA data have formed a basis of public scrutiny of mortgage lending 
with regard to fairness and have become an important aspect of fair lending enforcement. 
In response to significant changes in the mortgage market during the 1990s, 
particularly the emergence and growth of subprime lending, the Federal Reserve Board in 
2002 revised its Regulation C, which implements HMDA (for details, refer to the appendix).
4  
The revision substantially increased the type and amount of public information available 
about home lending in HMDA reports, beginning with data for 2004.  The most important 
change was the requirement that lenders identify and disclose information about mortgages 
with annual percentage rates (APRs, which encompass interest rates and fees) above 
designated thresholds, mortgages referred to here as “higher-priced loans.”
5  Other new 
disclosures included lien status (whether a loan is a first lien, a junior lien, or unsecured 
home improvement loan) and whether a loan is secured by a manufactured home or is subject 
to the protections of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA).    
 
                                                 
3 For example, John Goering and Ron Wienk, eds. (1996), Mortgage Lending, Racial Discrimination, 
and Federal Policy (Washington:  Urban Institute Press). 
4 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-11), Regulation C (12 C.F.R. pt. 203), and the 
staff commentary accompanying Regulation C (12 C.F.R. pt. 203, Supp. I). 
 
5 For loans with spreads above designated thresholds, revised Regulation C requires the reporting of 
the spread between the APR on a loan and the rate on Treasury securities of comparable maturity. The 
thresholds for reporting differ by lien status: 3 percentage points for first liens and 5 percentage points for 
junior, or subordinate, liens.  Further details are in note 12, p. A126, of Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, “Higher-
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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2004 AND 2005 DATA 
For both the 2004 and 2005 HMDA data, nearly 80 percent of the reporting institutions were 
depositories (commercial banks, savings associations, or credit unions); independent 
mortgage companies or mortgage companies affiliated with banking institutions or their 
holding companies accounted for the rest.  Although mortgage companies represented only 
22 percent of the reporting institutions, they submitted information on more than 60 percent 
of all the reported loans and applications.   
Most lenders reported relatively little home lending.  The most active lenders (those 
providing information on 5,000 or more loans or applications) accounted for about 5 percent 
of the reporting institutions and nearly 90 percent of all the reported loans and applications.  
A comparison of the HMDA data for 2004 and 2005 with those from earlier years 
documented a number of trends, including a growing share of lending to non-owner-
occupants, the growth of “piggyback” lending (homebuyers simultaneously obtaining a first 
lien and a junior lien loan to finance the purchase of a home), and a substantial decline in the 
share of all lending insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).   
Because of its importance, the new information on loan pricing was the focus of 
much of the analyses of the 2004 and 2005 data.  The reviews found that the incidence of 
higher-priced lending increased substantially from about 16 percent of all loans in 2004 to 26 
percent in 2005.  The substantial narrowing of the difference between short- and long-term 
interest rates in 2005 explained part of the increase in the share of reported loans that 
exceeded the pricing thresholds established by Regulation C.
6  Estimates suggested that the 
                                                 
6 For additional research on the possible reasons for the increase in reported higher-priced lending from 
2004 to 2005, refer to Michael LaCour-Little (2007), “Economic Factors Affecting Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act Reporting,” paper prepared for the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Mid-Year 
Meeting, Washington, May 29-30.  The study finds that, after controlling for the mix of loan types, for credit-
risk factors, and for changes in the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates, there was no 2006 HMDA Data  -5-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
changes in interest rates accounted for about 15 percent of the increase in reported higher-
priced lending for conventional fixed-rate home-purchase loans and about 20 percent of the 
increase for similar loans for refinancings.  Another portion of the increase in higher-priced 
lending was attributable to the effects of the narrowing spread between short- and long-term 
interest rates on adjustable-rate lending, but available data limited the ability to quantify this 
effect.  Besides changes in market interest rates, other factors—changes in borrower credit-
risk profiles and changes in lender business practices such as an increased willingness to 
accept higher-risk borrowers—may also have led to increased higher-priced lending from 
2004 to 2005; but again, quantifying the influences was impeded by data limitations.  
Analysis of the 2004 and 2005 pricing information also found that the incidence of 
higher-priced lending varied substantially by geography, by loan characteristic, and across 
borrower groups.  The incidence of higher-priced lending was found to be elevated for 
borrowers residing in census tracts characterized by larger proportions of individuals with 
lower credit scores and lower high-school graduation rates; and in census tracts with larger 
proportions of lower-income households, minority households, and shares of loan applicants 
that were denied credit.
7  The incidence of higher-priced lending was also elevated for 
smaller-size loans or piggyback loans, for loans made by depository institutions outside their 
local communities, and for independent mortgage companies regardless of location.   
Results of an analysis along racial and ethnic lines were consistent with the results by 
geography:  Blacks and Hispanic whites were more likely, and Asians somewhat less likely, 
to have received higher-priced loans than non-Hispanic whites.  Information included in the 
HMDA data on characteristics of borrowers and loans—such as income, amount borrowed, 
                                                                                                                                                       
statistically significant increase in the volume of higher-priced lending for loans originated directly by lenders, 
but there was an increase for such loans originated through indirect channels. 
 
7 The term “minority” as used in this article refers to any racial or ethnic identity other than non-
Hispanic white. 2006 HMDA Data  -6-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
and property location—do not account fully for the variation in loan pricing across 
geographies and groups.  However, many factors routinely used by lenders to underwrite and 
price loans—including loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and measures of borrower credit history 
(for example, a credit history score)—are not included in the HMDA data and, consequently, 
cannot be included in an analysis of pricing differences that relies on the HMDA data alone.   
The expanded HMDA data have both raised concerns about the fairness of the 
lending process and created new avenues for lenders, regulators, and the public to address 
fairness.  Lenders are responsible for ensuring compliance with fair lending laws, and the 
HMDA data can both encourage and facilitate the improvement of their compliance efforts. 
Likewise, the regulatory agencies have been using the expanded data in their fair lending 
enforcement activities.  The expanded data also increase transparency in the marketplace by 
identifying lenders active in the higher-priced segment of the market and by allowing a wide 
variety of analyses that more fully describe higher-priced lending.   
 
LOAN PRICING IN THE MORTGAGE MARKET  
Mortgage markets have changed greatly over the years.  Historically, mortgage lenders 
offered consumers a relatively limited array of loan products.  The prices (interest rates, 
points, and fees) at which they offered their loans varied mainly by  
• loan type—for example, conventional or government-backed  
• loan characteristic—including amount borrowed, term to maturity, and LTV ratio 
• type of structure securing the loan—traditional “site built” home, factory-
manufactured unit, or multifamily units 
• ownership status—owner occupied or non-owner occupied  
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The prices did not, however, vary to any great degree by the creditworthiness of the 
borrower; effectively, borrowers either did or did not meet the underwriting criteria for a 
particular loan product, and the borrowers who met the criteria all paid about the same price.   
In the past quarter century, advances in technology, improvements in access to the 
credit histories of individuals, and the emergence of a robust secondary market for loans over 
the full spectrum of credit risks have helped spur remarkable changes in the mortgage 
market.  The most prominent of those developments has been the explicit risk-based pricing 
of credit.  Over this period, more so than in the past, differences in the creditworthiness of 
different borrowers lead to different prices for the same product.
8  Less creditworthy 
applicants, or those either unwilling or unable to document their creditworthiness or income, 
found it increasingly less likely that they would be turned down for a loan; rather, they were  
offered credit but at higher prices.   
Explicit risk-based pricing has expanded opportunities for homeownership and 
allowed individuals, including those who otherwise have little access to credit, to more 
readily purchase homes or borrow against the equity they have accumulated in their homes.  
Recent developments in mortgage markets have caused some lenders to tighten underwriting 
and charge higher prices to compensate for perceived risk.  However, risk-based pricing 
continues to be a feature of the mortgage market.   Although risk-based pricing has 
broadened opportunities for many consumers, it has been accompanied by growing concerns 
some of which are noted below. 
 
                                                 
8 Refer, for example, to Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross (2006), “The 
Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 88 
(January/February), pp. 31-56. 2006 HMDA Data  -8-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Segments of the Market 
Broadly, borrowers in the higher-priced mortgage market generally fall into one of two 
“nonprime” market segments:  “subprime” and “near prime.”  Individuals in the subprime 
category pay the highest prices because they are considered to pose the greatest risk of 
default or prepayment.
9  Such borrowers may also impose higher costs of origination as it can 
be more difficult and time consuming to assess their credit profiles.  Borrowers in the prime 
market pay the lowest prices for loans and near-prime borrowers pay rates between those 
paid by subprime and prime borrowers.  In practice, the dividing line between subprime and 
near prime is somewhat amorphous, as is the line between the prime and nonprime markets.  
The distinctions between all these market segments change over time as market interest rates 
move, as lenders’ appetite for interest rate, prepayment, or credit risk changes, and as the 
ability to price risk more exactly is changed. 
  Industry sources provide some data on the relative sizes of these market segments.  
For example, in 2006 about 20 percent of mortgages were subprime, and about 13 percent 
were near prime (often referred to as alt-A).
10   
 
Nontraditional Loan Products 
Sharp increases in home values in many areas of the country over the first half of this decade, 
along with competitive pressures to innovate, moved lenders to develop loan products that 
were intended to hold down required monthly payments, at least for the first few years of the 
loan.  These products, such as interest-only loans, adjustable-rate loans with discounted 
(“teaser”) initial rates, and payment option loans, increase the affordability of home 
                                                 
9 Prepayment penalties are a common feature of loans in the subprime market and are intended to 
address the elevated risk of prepayment.   
10 Inside Mortgage Finance (2007), The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 1: The Primary 
Market (Bethesda, Md.: Inside Mortgage Finance Publications). 2006 HMDA Data  -9-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
purchases and mortgage refinancings, at least in the short term.  However, these loan 
products sometimes are accompanied by minimal down payments (or a piggyback loan), and 
the limited or zero repayment of principal in the amortization schedule of many of these loan 
products means that mortgage payments generate little or no additional equity in the first few 
years.  These loans also generally involve an increase in monthly payments at some point 
later in the life of the loan.  Recently, however, there is some evidence that these so-called 
nontraditional loan products have elevated incidence of default and foreclosure, particularly 
when extended in combination with other indicators of elevated credit risk, such as a low 
credit score or no documentation of income.  They have also drawn considerable attention 
from regulatory authorities, which have provided guidance to banking institutions on the 
risks posed by such loan products and the importance of providing clear disclosure of the 
terms and conditions of such loans.
11 
 
The Role of Brokers 
Another notable development in the mortgage market has been the emergence of brokers as 
the intermediary through which the majority of individuals now obtain a mortgage.
12  
Historically, prospective borrowers visited an office of a local banking institution to apply for 
a loan.  Today, mortgage brokers, often working as independent entities, take loan 
applications on behalf of a banking institution or other mortgage lender and often provide the 
only direct contact with the borrower until closing, when the loan documents are signed and 
                                                 
11 For example, on September 29, 2006, the federal financial regulatory agencies (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration,  
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision) issued the press release 
“Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks,” 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2006/20060929/default.htm. 
12 Industry sources indicate that mortgage brokers initiated 58 percent of the mortgage originations in 
2006, down somewhat from 63 percent in 2005 (Lew Sichelman, 2007, “Broker Market Share Down to 58%,” 
National Mortgage News, July 9, p. 1). 2006 HMDA Data  -10-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
the mortgage is issued.  Mortgage brokers play an important role in pricing the loan, and 
frequently the compensation they receive is based, in whole or in part, on the interest rate and 
fees paid by the consumer.   
The central role played by brokers in the lending process has gained increased 
attention in the past year or so as delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures have increased, 
particularly in the subprime portion of the mortgage market.  A number of facets of their role 
have drawn increased scrutiny, including whether they provide consumers sufficient 
information to make sound choices in selecting a mortgage product and whether fraud has 
sometimes been involved in the broker’s characterization of the borrower’s creditworthiness 
or in the appraisal of the home being purchased.  Also, brokers and, many times, the lenders 
originating the loan do not bear the credit risk of the loans they sell but share in the profits 
from originating the loan.  This means that the broker or other originating party may not have 
the incentive to fully pass along to the loan purchasers all relevant information needed to 




Concerns about Loan Pricing  
As price flexibility has emerged in the mortgage market, so have concerns about the fairness 
of pricing outcomes.  Such concerns generally fall into four broad categories.  First are 
concerns about possible discrimination based on the race or ethnicity of the borrower.  Such 
concerns are heightened because loan prices are not always determined strictly on the basis 
of credit risk or cost factors but can involve elements of discretion, in which loan officers or 
                                                 
13 In some cases, brokers and loan originators may be subject to forced repurchase of a loan that was 
sold if it performs poorly soon after loan origination, or if representations and warranties were violated; but in 
practice, brokers and some of the firms they sometimes work with have limited capacity to fund a repurchase.   2006 HMDA Data  -11-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
loan brokers may seek prices that differ from those on rate sheets or other techniques used by 
lenders to establish baseline prices.   
Second are concerns about whether borrowers in the higher-priced segment of the 
loan market are sufficiently informed and whether they are willing or able to shop effectively 
for the loan terms most appropriate to their circumstances.  For example, it may be difficult 
for borrowers to determine where they fit along the credit-risk spectrum.  Also, some 
borrowers may fail to shop or negotiate for the best available rates and terms because they 
need funds immediately; such borrowers tend to focus primarily on the amount they can 
borrow and the size of the monthly payment.  Such borrowers may not fully appreciate the 
potential longer-run consequences of certain loan terms such as prepayment penalties, 
adjustable interest rates, negative amortization, and balloon payments.  Such borrowers may 
be more easily exploited by loan officers or brokers.  Also, such borrowers may be 
susceptible to aggressive marketing tactics that may confuse borrowers about the cost and 
terms of loans.  
Third, concerns have been raised about whether competition is adequate to ensure 
that borrowers in the higher-priced segment of the loan market have access to the full range 
of credit opportunities.  Some believe that prime-market lenders are not present or do not 
offer or promote their prime products sufficiently in certain geographic markets, including 
neighborhoods that have larger minority populations.  In this view, reduced access to prime 
lenders and their products limits the opportunities for borrowers in affected communities to 
access lower-priced loans.   
Finally, the elevated default and foreclosure rates currently experienced in the higher-
priced portion of the loan market have raised concerns about the sustainability of 
homeownership, the adverse effects on neighborhoods with higher concentrations of these 2006 HMDA Data  -12-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
loans, and the hardship on borrowers who are losing their homes.  Recognizing these 
concerns the federal and state financial institution regulatory agencies have encouraged 
lenders and servicers of loans to work with mortgage borrowers facing financial 
difficulties.
14 
These various concerns about the functioning of the mortgage market raise important 
public policy issues that are beyond the scope of this article.  Nonetheless, the expanded 
HMDA data provide information that has proven useful in understanding and addressing 
many of these issues. 
 
GENERAL FINDINGS FROM THE 2006 HMDA DATA 
For 2006, lenders covered by HMDA reported information on 27.5 million applications for 
home loans.  Almost all the applications were for loans to be secured by one- to four-family 
(so-called single-family) houses, as follows:  10.9 million applications to purchase a home, 
2.5 million to make home improvements, and 14.0 million to refinance an existing home 
loan.  The balance (about 0.1 million) was for loans secured by multifamily dwellings—those 
for ﬁve or more families (table 1 [tables appear after main text]).  
 
These applications resulted 
in nearly 14 million loan extensions.  Lenders also reported information on 6.2 million loans 
they purchased from other institutions and on 411,000 requests for pre-approvals of home-
purchase loans; the pre-approval requests either were turned down by the lender at the time 
                                                 
14 On April 17, 2007, the federal financial regulatory agencies issued guidance to encourage supervised 
institutions to work constructively with homeowners who are financially unable to continue meeting their 
mortgage payments (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2007/SR0706).  On September 4, 2007, the 
federal financial regulatory agencies and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) issued a statement 
encouraging federally regulated financial institutions and state-supervised entities that service securitized 
residential mortgages to determine the full extent of their authority under pooling and servicing agreements to 
identify borrowers at risk of default and pursue appropriate loss mitigation strategies designed to preserve 
homeownership (“Federal Financial Regulatory Agencies and CSBS Issue Statement on Loss Mitigation 
Strategies for Servicers of Residential Mortgages,” 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20070904a.htm).   2006 HMDA Data  -13-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
the pre-approval was sought or (not shown in table) were granted but not acted on by the 
applicant.  
The total number of reported applications and purchased loans fell 2.3 million, or 6 
percent, from 2005; most of the decline was for refinancings. The number of applications for 
loans to reﬁnance an existing loan fell 1.9 million, or about 12 percent; the number declined 
most likely because short-term interest rates increased from the end of 2005 through much of 
2006 and thereby reduced the number of existing loans that could be refinanced at a lower 
rate.  Slower house-price appreciation and, in some areas, outright declines in property values 
also likely diminished the attractiveness of refinancing or the borrower’s ability to refinance. 
For 2006, HMDA reporting requirements covered 8,886 institutions—including 3,900 
commercial banks, 946 savings institutions, 2,036 credit unions, and 2,004 mortgage 
companies (table 2).  Of the mortgage companies, two-thirds were independent entities—that 
is, they were neither subsidiaries of depository institutions nor affiliates of bank holding 
companies (data derived from table).  The total number of reporting institutions was about 
the same as that in 2005, as was the distribution of reporters by type of institution.  
 
Activity and Size of Lender 
As in earlier years, most of the institutions reporting HMDA data are small regardless of  
whether they are measured by asset size or by some indicator of lending activity such as the 
number of reported applications or loans (table 3).  For 2006, 60 percent of the reporting 
institutions, each of which provided information on fewer than 250 loans or applications, 
accounted for just 1.7 percent of all the reported data.  At the other extreme, 5 percent of 
reporting institutions, each of which provided information on 5,000 or more loans or 
applications, accounted for 87 percent of all the reported data.  2006 HMDA Data  -14-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Many HMDA reporters are affiliated with each other.  If individual HMDA reporters 
are aggregated to their highest level of corporate organization (such as a bank or thrift 
institution holding company), the concentration of mortgage lending nationwide is evident.  
The twenty-ﬁve organizations reporting the largest number of applications and loans 
accounted for 54 percent of the 2006 data, roughly the same proportions as in the 2004 and 
2005 HMDA data (data not shown in tables).  
 
Disposition of Applications, Loan Types, and HOEPA-Related Activities 
For purposes of analysis, loan applications and loans can be grouped in many ways; here the 
analysis focuses on twenty-ﬁve distinct product categories characterized by loan and property 
type, purpose of the loan, and lien and owner-occupancy status.   Each product category 
contains information on the number of total and pre-approval applications, application 
denials, originated loans, loans with prices above the thresholds, loans covered by the 
HOEPA, and the mean and median APR spreads for loans priced above the designated 
reporting thresholds (tables 4 and 5).
15  
 
Disposition of Applications 
HMDA data are the only publicly available source of information on the disposition of 
individual applications for home loans.  The data include information on the race, ethnicity, 
and sex of applicants as well as the type and purpose of the loan and the location of the 
property, so the disposition of applications can be assessed along many dimensions.   
                                                 
15 Transition rules governing the reporting of the expanded HMDA data created problems for assessing 
the data on loan pricing, manufactured-home lending, and pre-approvals.  The transition rules had a large 
influence on the data reported for 2004 and a much smaller effect on the 2005 data.  In the 2006 data, transition 
rules affected only about 6,000 applications and 1,100 loans; the analysis here excludes those applications and 
loans for analyses that pertain to pricing, manufactured-home lending, and pre-approvals. 
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The HMDA data for 2006, like those from earlier years, indicate that lenders approve 
most of the applications they receive, although the proportion approved or denied varies by 
loan purpose, type of loan and property, and lien status.  In general, denial rates are higher 
for reﬁnancings and for home-improvement loans than for home-purchase loans, perhaps 
because of the prequaliﬁcation and ﬁnancial counseling activities that many prospective 
borrowers go through before purchasing a home (table 4).  Denial rates are lower for 
government-backed loans than for conventional loans but are especially high for loans to 
purchase manufactured homes.  Overall, the denial rate for all home loans in 2006 was 29 
percent, compared with 27 percent in 2005. 
 
Conventional and Government-Backed Loans   
Consistent with earlier years, most reported home loan activity in 2006 involved 
conventional loans—that is, non-government-backed loans (table 4).  Such loans accounted 
for about 95 percent of all loan extensions in 2006.  FHA-insured loans accounted for about 
three-fourths of the government-backed loans, and most of the rest involved guarantees by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (data not shown in tables).  The share of all 
HMDA-reported loans backed by the FHA has fallen over the past several years, from about 
16 percent in 2000 to less than 3 percent in 2005 and 2006 (data not shown in tables).  (The 
FHA share of first-lien home-purchase loans has also been trending down and in 2006 was 
about 5 percent.)   The development of a wide range of conventional loan products in recent 
years, including many nontraditional products involving more-flexible and quicker 
underwriting, has attracted borrowers who, in the past, might have sought FHA backing.  
Among the newer conventional loan products are those intended to serve borrowers seeking 
to minimize their down payment or initial monthly payments and those who are unable or 2006 HMDA Data  -16-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
unwilling to document their incomes.  Also, in some areas of the country, high home prices 
have diminished the attractiveness of the FHA program, as increases in the maximum loan 
value that the FHA will insure have failed keep pace with increases in local home values.  
  For each loan made, the HMDA data show the amount borrowed and the incomes of 
the borrowers.  The analysis that follows immediately considers four loan categories:   (1) 
conventional loans that met the threshold for reporting as higher-priced loans under HMDA, 
(2) all other conventional loans, (3) FHA-insured loans, and (4) VA-guaranteed loans.  The 
analysis is limited to site-built, owner-occupied, one- to four-family units, and the four 
categories are applied separately to home-purchase loans and refinancings. 
  As noted, distinguishing higher-priced loans from others is one way to differentiate 
lending activity.  A second approach is to distinguish loans that fall within the size limits set 
for loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to purchase (conforming loans) and 
those above those limits (nonconforming, or jumbo).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
government-sponsored enterprises that focus on conventional loans that meet certain size 
limits and other underwriting criteria.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold some of their 
purchased loans in their own portfolios, but they convert most of them into securities, which 
they sell to investors.  For 2006 the conforming loan size limit was $417,000 for a single-unit 
property, with limits 50 percent higher for such properties in Alaska and Hawaii.  The 
conforming loan limits are higher for structures accommodating two, three, or four families; 
however, the HMDA data do not distinguish among properties with fewer than four units, so 
the discussion here focuses on the $417,000 limit.
16   
  For 2006, about 90 percent of conventional loans for purchase and likewise for 
refinancing, whether higher-priced or not, were within the conforming loan limit (table 6).  
                                                 
16 For all the 2006 limits, refer to Fannie Mae (2005), “Fannie Mae Announces 2006 Conforming Loan 
Limit of $417,000,” press release, Nov. 29, www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2005/3649.jhtml. 2006 HMDA Data  -17-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Higher-priced loans tended to be somewhat smaller than others; for example, among 
conventional home-purchase loans, the mean size of higher-priced mortgages was $209,000, 
compared with $246,000 for others (table 6, memo item).   
  By their nature, FHA-insured loans tend to be considerably smaller than conventional 
loans; the difference reflects the relatively low insurance limits of the FHA and the focus of 
the program on lower- and middle-income borrowers.  For 2006, the mean size of FHA-
insured home-purchase loans was $133,000, and nearly half of such loans were for less than 
$125,000, whereas only about one-fourth of the conventional loans were in that size range. 
  Borrower incomes differ substantially by loan product (table 7).  Not surprisingly, the 
mean income of borrowers with conventional loans was about double that of borrowers with 
FHA-insured loans.  Among those obtaining conventional home-purchase mortgages, the 
mean income of individuals with a conforming loan was $82,400, versus a mean income of 
$258,000 for those with a jumbo loan.  And, again among borrowers using conventional 
loans, those using higher-priced loans either to purchase a home or to refinance had a mean 
income about 20 percent lower than borrowers not paying higher prices.  
 
Non-Owner-Occupant Lending 
Part of the strong performance of housing markets over the first half of this decade can be 
traced to the growth in sales of homes to investors or individuals purchasing second or 
vacation homes, units collectively described as “non-owner occupied.”  HMDA data can 
document the role of investors and second-home buyers in the housing market because the 
data indicate whether the subject property is intended as the borrower’s principal dwelling 
(that is, as an owner-occupied unit).
17  A limitation on this type of analysis is that some 
                                                 
 
17 An investment property is a non-owner-occupied dwelling that is intended to be continuously rented.  2006 HMDA Data  -18-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
buyers do not use home mortgages to finance their purchase; rather, they pay cash for the 
properties or, in some instances, take out commercial loans.  After declining in the early 
1990s, the share of non-owner-occupant lending among first-lien loans to purchase one- to 
four-family site-built homes began rising in 1994, and it has risen in every year between 
1996 (when it was 6.4 percent) and 2005, when it reached 17.3 percent (table 8).  For 2006, 
the share fell somewhat, to 16.5 percent.  Further, in line with the experience for home-
purchase loans to owner-occupants, the number of conventional first-lien loans to purchase 
homes by non-owner-occupants fell about 17 percent from 2005. 
 
Piggyback Lending 
Many ﬁrst-time homebuyers have relatively limited assets and thus cannot qualify for other 
than a mortgage with a high LTV ratio.  Other borrowers have the ﬁnancial capacity to make 
a large down payment but prefer not to do so.  Lenders and secondary-market purchasers 
often require loans with high LTV ratios to be protected with private mortgage insurance 
(PMI), carried at the expense of the borrower, to indemnify them, at least in part, against the 
elevated risk of default on such loans.   
  In recent years, so-called piggyback loans have emerged as an alternative to PMI.
18  
In piggyback lending, borrowers simultaneously receive a ﬁrst mortgage and a junior-lien 
(piggyback) loan.  The piggyback loan finances the portion of the purchase price not being 
financed by the first mortgage and sometimes any cash payment that might have been made; 
the junior loan may amount to as much as 20 percent of the purchase price.  Some borrowers 
                                                                                                                                                       
Non-owner-occupied units—vacation homes and second homes—that are for the primary use of the owner are 
not considered investment properties.  The HMDA data do not, however, distinguish between these two types of 
non-owner-occupied dwellings.  
18 Some individuals take out piggyback loans so that the first-lien mortgage can meet the conforming 
loan size limits. 2006 HMDA Data  -19-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
have chosen a piggyback loan instead of a loan backed by PMI in part because, until recently, 
borrower payments for PMI could not be itemized for federal income tax purposes, whereas 
the interest paid on piggyback loans could be.  Also, without the piggyback loan, some home 
purchases might not have been possible because the underwriting standards applied by PMI 
companies may have been more conservative than those used by the lender providing the 
piggyback loan.   
  The expanded HMDA data document substantial growth in piggyback lending since 
2004 and, together with data reported by PMI companies, suggest that such lending played an 
important role in home sales over the past few years.
19  In 2006, lenders covered by HMDA 
reported on 1.43 million junior-lien loans to purchase homes, almost all conventional loans 
and a number about 4 percent greater than in 2005 (data not shown in tables).  About 22 
percent of the 2006 first-lien home-purchase loans on owner-occupied site-built homes for 
one to four families involved a piggyback loan as identified here, a proportion that was 
unchanged from 2005 data.  The overall increase in the number of reported junior-lien loans 
taken out to finance a home purchase from 2005 to 2006 is notable because the number of 
reported conventional first-lien home-purchase loans fell nearly 12 percent from 2005 to 
2006.  Further, in 2006 piggyback lending apparently continued to gain market share at the 
expense of PMI, as the number of home-purchase loans backed by PMI declined about 6 
percent from 2005 to 2006.
20  
 
                                                 
19 Piggyback loans are not identified explicitly in the HMDA data.  However, by matching junior-lien 
home-purchase loans with first-lien home-purchase loans extended at the same time to borrowers with the same 
characteristics and census tract location, an estimate of the incidence of piggyback loans, at least for those 
originated by the same lender, can be derived.  About 85 percent of junior-lien loans reported in the HMDA 
data can be matched in this manner. 
 
20 Refer to the annual PMI data published by the FFIEC at www.ffiec.gov. 2006 HMDA Data  -20-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Manufactured Home Lending 
Manufactured homes, which often sell for less than site-built homes, are an important option 
for many homebuyers.
21  However, the credit risks associated with manufactured-home 
lending also tend to be higher than for site-built homes, and consequently, loans backed by 
manufactured units carry relatively high interest rates.   
Beginning with the 2004 data, HMDA has required lenders to include a code to 
identify applications and loans involving manufactured homes.
22  The 2006 data indicate that 
4,477 lenders extended about 256,000 manufactured-home loans, a loan volume little 
changed from 2005 (data not shown in tables).  Despite the large number of lenders 
extending at least one mortgage for a manufactured home, such lending is relatively 
concentrated:  83 percent of the reported manufactured home loans were reported by just ten 
lenders.  About three-fifths of reported manufactured-home loans were used to purchase 
homes and a relatively large portion of those mortgages were FHA-insured (18 percent, 
versus about 5 percent on the purchase of site-built homes).  
Delinquency rates on manufactured homes tend to be higher than for other types of 
home loans, and the resulting lender caution is reflected in very high denial rates for home-
purchase applications on such properties (table 4).  (The elevated credit risk also is reflected 
in elevated loan prices, discussed below.)  Because the use of manufactured homes varies 
greatly across populations and geographies, analyses of denial-rate differences across groups 
should differentiate between site-built and manufactured housing. 
 
                                                 
 
21 Unlike site-built homes, manufactured homes are generally assembled in factories and shipped to a 
home site.  
 
22 In the years preceding 2004, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) helped 
users of the HMDA data identify, albeit imperfectly, applications and loans related to manufactured homes by 
producing each year a list of reporting institutions (typically about twenty) that it believed were primarily in the 
business of extending such credit.  Refer to www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html.  2006 HMDA Data  -21-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Loans Covered by HOEPA 
Under the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), certain types of 
mortgage loans that have rates or fees above speciﬁed levels require additional disclosures to 
consumers and are subject to certain restrictions on loan terms.
23 
  
Under the 2002 revisions 
to Regulation C, the expanded HMDA data include a code to identify whether a loan is 
subject to the protections of HOEPA.  
Coverage under HOEPA is determined by a two-part test that considers both the APR 
and the dollar amount of points and fees.  The APR portion of the coverage test is similar to 
that used to determine which loans are higher priced under HMDA.  In the case of HMDA, 
however, identifying higher-priced loans requires using the Treasury security of comparable 
maturity for the ﬁfteenth day of the month preceding the date on which the loan rate was set.  
For HOEPA, the APR portion of the coverage test requires using the Treasury security of 
comparable maturity for the ﬁfteenth day of the month preceding the month in which the 
application was received.  Another difference is that the APR spreads for determining 
HOEPA coverage are higher than for determining which loans must be reported as higher-
priced under HMDA.   HOEPA coverage is based on spreads that exceed 8 percent and 10 
percent for first- and junior-lien loans, respectively, versus minimum spreads of 3 percent 
and 5 percent, respectively, in HMDA higher-priced loans. 
Before the release of the 2004 data, little information was publicly available about the 
extent of HOEPA-related lending or the number or type of institutions involved in that 
activity.  Although the expanded HMDA data provide important new information, the data 
fail to capture all HOEPA-related lending.  Some HOEPA loans are extended by institutions 
not covered by HMDA, and some HOEPA loans made by HMDA-covered institutions are 
                                                 
 
23 HOEPA is implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z 
(www.federalreserve.gov/regulations/default.htm). 2006 HMDA Data  -22-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
not reported under Regulation C, which implements HMDA.  Most notably, if the proceeds 
of a home-secured loan are not used to reﬁnance an existing home loan or to ﬁnance home 
improvements, then the loan may be covered by HOEPA but is not reportable under 
Regulation C.
 
 The extent of HOEPA-related lending not reported under HMDA is unknown.   
For 2006, roughly 1,200 lenders reported extending about 15,200 loans covered by 
HOEPA (table 4).  Only 17 lenders made 100 or more HOEPA loans, and most lenders did 
not report any such loans (data not shown in tables).  A majority of the HOEPA loans 
involved a refinancing, and about two-thirds of these were first-lien loans.  In the aggregate, 
HOEPA-related lending accounts for a very small proportion of the loan market:  HOEPA 
loans accounted for less than 0.1 percent of all the originations of home-secured reﬁnancings 
and home-improvement loans reported for 2006 (data derived from table 4). 
 
THE 2006 HMDA DATA ON LOAN PRICING 
The sections that follow analyze the loan-pricing information in the 2006 HMDA data by 
lender, loan product, geography, and characteristics of borrowers and their neighborhoods. 
 
Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending 
As in 2004 and 2005, most loans reported in 2006 were not higher-priced as defined under 
Regulation C.  Among all the HMDA reported loans, 28.7 percent were higher-priced in 
2006, up from 26.2 percent in 2005 (table 4).  Later sections of this article focus on the 
changes in the incidence of higher-priced lending from 2005 to 2006; this section focuses on 
2006 pricing patterns across loan products.  
  The incidence of higher-priced lending differs by loan product (table 4).  For 
example, 2006 HMDA Data  -23-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
• Loans backed by the government—either insured by the FHA or guaranteed by 
VA—have a much lower incidence of higher-priced lending than do conventional 
loans used for the same purpose.   
• First-lien home-purchase loans have a lower incidence of higher-priced lending 
than do junior-lien loans used for that purpose.   
• Manufactured-home loans exhibit the greatest incidence of higher pricing 
regardless of purpose.   
• First-lien home-purchase loans extended to non-owner occupants have a higher 
incidence of higher-priced lending than do comparable loans to owner occupants. 
 
Rate Spreads for Higher-Priced Lending  
Variation in APR spreads between home-purchase loans and loans used in refinancings is 
much smaller than the variations in incidence noted above.  For example, for higher-priced 
conventional ﬁrst-lien loans for an owner-occupied site-built home, the mean APR spreads 
were about 5 percentage points above the yields on comparable treasuries both for purchase 
loans and reﬁnancings (table 4).  A similar pattern is found for conventional junior-lien 
loans:  They show a mean spread of about 7 percentage points whether used for home 
purchase or refinancing.   
  As noted, loans backed by manufactured homes are substantially more likely to be 
higher-priced than loans backed by site-built properties.  However, for each of those two 
products, the mean spreads paid by those with higher-priced loans are roughly the same 
whether the loan is for home purchase or refinancing.   2006 HMDA Data  -24-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
As in 2004 and 2005, only a relatively small proportion (about 10 percent) of first-
lien loans have very large spreads—7 percentage points or more.  Similarly, only a relatively 
small proportion of junior-lien loans have spreads of 9 percentage points or more. 
 
Lenders and Higher-Priced Lending 
The concentration of higher-priced lending among institutions covered by HMDA fell 
somewhat in 2006, although it remains fairly high.   About 5,000 of the nearly 8,900 lenders 
covered by HMDA in 2006 reported extending fewer than 10 higher-priced loans (data not 
shown in tables).  At the other end of the spectrum, the roughly 1,250 lenders that reported 
making at least 100 higher-priced loans in 2006 accounted for 97 percent of all such loans.  
The share of such lending attributable to the 10 lenders with the largest volume of higher-
priced loans dropped from 59 percent in 2005 to 35 percent in 2006.  
Another aspect of concentration is the extent to which institutions that extend higher-
price loans may be considered to be “specialists” in that activity, that is, to have a large 
proportion of their lending in the higher-priced category.  Such specialized institutions can 
have a business orientation that is quite different from that of other lenders.
24  Taking 60 
percent of loans as a benchmark for defining higher-priced specialists, about 25 percent of 
the roughly 1,250 lenders reporting at least 100 higher-priced loans, or about 4 percent of all 
reporting institutions, were specialists.  The HMDA data on pricing can only approximately 
indicate the extent to which a lender specializes in subprime loans because some prime loans 
are higher-priced, and some subprime loans are not.  
Higher-priced lending activity may also be described by type of lender.  Four 
groupings are provided here—depository institutions and three types of mortgage company, 
                                                 
24 For example, specialists in higher-priced lending may use different marketing practices and may rely 
quite heavily on the ability to sell loans to secondary-market purchasers.   2006 HMDA Data  -25-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
namely, independents, direct subsidiaries of depository institutions, and affiliates of 
depository institutions.  Regarding conventional first-lien loans for site-built homes in both 
2004 and 2005, independent mortgage companies originated about 50 percent of the higher-
priced loans and about 30 percent of all such loans; in contrast, depository institutions 
originated about 25 percent of the higher-priced loans and about 45 percent of all such loans 
(table 9). 
The overall market shares across the four categories of lender are virtually unchanged 
from 2005 to 2006.  However, there are changes in market shares of higher-priced lending 
across groups of lenders.  Depository institutions have increased their share of the higher-
priced loan market while the market share of independent mortgage companies has fallen by 
about the same number of percentage points.  Notably, the incidence of higher-priced lending 
for independent mortgage companies is unchanged from 2005, which suggests that the 
increase in market share for depositories is not caused by independent mortgage companies 
abandoning that segment of the market.     
The recent turmoil in the subprime sector has caused a number of lenders, primarily 
independent mortgage companies, to cease operations, curtail their activities, or transfer or 
sell their business to others.  As a consequence, the 2007 HMDA data may reveal a notable 
change in the sources of higher-priced lending, likely with a diminished share coming from 
independent mortgage companies.  
 
Factors that Influence Higher-Priced Lending 
As described in our assessment of the 2005 data, three basic factors may cause the share of 
lending that is reported under HMDA as higher-priced to change from year to year:  (1)  
changes in the interest rate environment, particularly increases in short-term interest rates; (2)  2006 HMDA Data  -26-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
changes in the business practices of lenders, particularly in the products offered and the 
willingness or ability of lenders to bear credit risk; and (3) changes in the borrowing 
practices or credit-risk profiles of consumers.  Among the borrowing practices at issue are 
the relative preference for adjustable-rate versus fixed-rate loans and for interest rate 
reduction versus cash-out equity when refinancing; a change in credit-risk profiles would 
include changes in the distribution of credit scores among borrowers, in the down payments 
they make, and their levels of monthly mortgage payment relative to income.  Our previous 
analysis suggested that all three factors were likely responsible for the very large increase 
from 2004 to 2005 in the reported incidence of higher-priced lending.  Quantifying the 
precise contribution of each of these factors to the change in higher-priced lending proved 
difficult, however, largely because of a lack of available information within the HMDA 
data.
25   
  As noted, the incidence of higher-priced lending increased about 2.5 percentage 
points overall from 2005 to 2006.  However, the incidence of higher-priced lending by loan 
product differed considerably over the two years.  The most notable changes were increases 
in the incidence for conventional first-lien refinancings for owner-occupied properties, 
home-improvement lending, and lending to non-owner occupants.
26  The following sections 
analyze those increases in the incidence of higher-priced lending from 2005 to 2006 in terms 
of the three factors listed above. 
 
                                                 
25 LaCour-Little, “Economic Factors Affecting Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Reporting.”  
26 The increase from 2005 to 2006 in the incidence of higher-priced lending for home-purchase loans 
on non-owner-occupied properties was notable—from 20.3 percent to 28.6 percent.  In contrast, the incidence 
for the purchase of owner-occupied properties increased only slightly over the period, from 24.6 percent to 25.3 
percent.  2006 HMDA Data  -27-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
The Changing Interest Rate Situation 
The yield curve shows the relationship 
between the yield on debt instruments and 
their term to maturity (figure 1, right; and 
box “The Yield Curve,” next page).  
Changes in the relationship between long-
term and short-term interest rates as 
reflected in the shape of the yield curve 
affect the reporting of higher-priced loans 
under HMDA.  Most mortgages prepay in 
a relatively short period (typically well before the stated term of the loan is reached) because 
the individual moves and prepays the loan, or refinances, or defaults.  Because mortgages 
tend to prepay before their stated maturity, lenders use relatively shorter-term interest rates to 
help set mortgage rates.  Regulation C does not direct lenders to compare the APR on a loan 
with the yield on a Treasury security that matches the expected duration of the mortgage but, 
rather, that matches the stated maturity of the loan.  Thus, the regulation effectively requires 
lenders to use longer-term rates to determine whether to report a loan as higher priced 
because the stated maturity of most home loans, particularly ﬁrst-lien loans, typically exceeds 
twenty years.   
  A consequence of the mismatch between the yields used to set mortgage prices and 
the approach adopted for determining higher-priced lending under HMDA is that a change 
from one year to the next in the relationship between short- and long-term rates can cause a 
change in the proportion of loans that are reported as higher priced, all other things being 
equal.  Most notably, if shorter-term interest rates increase relative to longer-term rates, both  
1. Spread between interest rates on thirty-year and  
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A. Yield curves on Treasury securities,  
      July 10, 2003 and 2006  
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_____________________________________________ 
[Box]   
The Yield Curve 
The yield curve describes the relationship between interest rates on financial instruments of different 
maturities (figure A).   
  The yield curve is typically upward sloping 
because longer-term investments ordinarily involve 
greater risk (credit risk, market interest rate risk, 
and inflation premium), and consequently  
investors require a higher return to be willing to 
invest their funds for longer periods.  Over the past 
twenty years, longer-term interest rates (for 
example, as represented by the annual yield on 
thirty-year Treasury securities) have almost always 
exceeded shorter-term interest rates (for example, 
as represented by the yield on five-year Treasury 
securities).  Figure 1, in the main text, portrays this 
relationship with the spread, or difference, between 
the yields on thirty-year and five-year Treasuries.  As shown there (and as illustrated by the selected 
dates shown in figure A), the yield curve was especially steep in the 2002-04 period, when short-term 
rates were quite low by historical standards but has become much flatter since then and has in fact 




the number and proportion of loans that exceed the HMDA price-reporting thresholds will 
rise even if there is no change in lender business practices or in borrower behavior. 
 
Fixed-rate lending and the incidence of higher-priced lending.  The changing interest rate 
environment from 2005 through 2006 likely explains part of the increase from 2005 in the 2006 HMDA Data  -29-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
share of reported loans that exceeded the pricing thresholds established by Regulation C.  
Throughout 2004 and 2005, long-term rates exceeded short-term rates (the yield curve was 
upward sloping), but the difference narrowed over this period as shorter-term rates increased 
rather steadily (the slope of the yield curve flattened).  The yield curve continued to flatten 
over much of 2006 as shorter-term rates increased, further narrowing the gap between 
short- and long-term rates.   
Using the methodology similar to that described in our analysis of the 2005 data, we 
estimate that, if all loans were fixed-rate loans, the flattening of the yield curve would have 
made the 2005-06 rise in the incidence of reported higher-price lending higher than it would 
have been in the absence of the yield-curve flattening, as follows (data not shown in tables):  
The flattening would have made the rise for conventional first-lien home-purchase loans 1.9 
percentage points higher, and it would have made the rise for similar loans for refinancings 
about 2.3 percentage points higher.
27  Without adjusting for the yield-curve effect, the actual 
increase in incidence in from 2005 to 2006 was 0.7 percentage point for those home-purchase 
loans and 5.3 percentage points for those refinancings.  Those unadjusted figures imply that 
if all of the loans reported in HMDA were fixed-rate loans, the change between 2005 and 
2006 in the incidence of high-priced lending for first-lien home-purchase loans would have 
been a modest decline of about 1.2 percentage points (0.7 less 1.9), as opposed to a modest 
increase.  The increase in the incidence for similar refinancing loans would have been about 
half of the actual reported increase in higher-priced lending (5.3 less 2.3).  Overall, our 
estimate of the roughly 2 percentage point effect on fixed-rate loans was of a similar 
magnitude to what we estimated for the change between 2004 and 2005.  
                                                 
27 The methodology is described on pp. A147-50 in Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, “Higher-Priced 
Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data.” 2006 HMDA Data  -30-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Additional analysis suggests that another portion of the increase in higher-priced 
lending arises from the effects of the flattening of the yield curve on adjustable-rate lending.  
Evidence provided below suggests that the effects of the flattening of the yield curve on 
adjustable-rate lending might be larger than on the effect on fixed-rate lending.   
 
Adjustable-rate lending and the incidence of higher-priced lending.  When the yield curve is 
steep, it suggests that the market expects short-term interest rates to rise, yet the method of 
calculation specified under Regulation Z for deriving the APR for adjustable-rate loans 
assumes that interest rates will stay the same.
   
Because of this regulatory construct, a 
positively sloped yield curve causes the APRs for adjustable-rate loans to be below those for 
ﬁxed-rate loans of similar term and credit risk.  Thus, the ﬂattening of the yield curve can 
have two effects.  First, it can narrow the gap between the longer-term rates used for the 
HMDA reporting threshold and the shorter-term rates used to price loans.  Second, ﬂattening 
of the yield curve can narrow or even invert the APR gap between adjustable- and ﬁxed-rate 
loans because, as short-term interest rates increase, it reduces the effect of the comparatively 
low APR calculations for adjustable-rate loans.  The APR gap can be inverted because the 
expected duration of adjustable- and fixed-rate loans differ—adjustable-rate loan are 
expected to be outstanding for shorter periods of time.  The APR calculations assume the 
durations are the same for both adjustable- and fixed-rate loans and thus underweight the 
value to the consumer of low teaser rates offered on many adjustable-rate loans.  For these 
reasons, a likely result of a ﬂattening (or inversion) of the yield curve is an increase in the 
proportion of adjustable-rate loans that exceed the HMDA price-reporting thresholds.  
 2006 HMDA Data  -31-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Figure 2 (left) illustrates these 
effects of a flattening yield curve.  The 
bottom three lines of the ﬁgure represent 
the differences (spreads) between the 
effective rates (APRs) of three loan types 
(the top three lines) and the HMDA 
reporting threshold.
28  As noted earlier, 
the reporting gap between the typical 
prime thirty-year ﬁxed-rate loan and the 
reporting threshold narrowed from 215 
basis points at the beginning of 2004 to 
144 basis points at the beginning of 2006 
and rose or fell some over the remainder 
of the year.  For one-year adjustable-rate loans, the gap narrowed much more, from about 
400 basis points at the beginning of 2004 to 52 basis points at the beginning of 2006, and 
then oscillated somewhat over the course of the year, ending at only 20 basis points.  This 
means that at the end of 2006, a one-year adjustable-rate mortgage with a contract rate of 
only ¼ percentage point above the Freddie Mac prime rate would have been reported as 
higher-priced under the HMDA reporting rules.  
The differences between the APRs and the reporting threshold decreased for both the 
ﬁxed-rate and adjustable-rate loans, but the decrease for adjustable-rate loans was much 
                                                 
28 The rates are from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey for 2004-06.  The Freddie Mac 
series for ﬁve-year adjustable rates did not begin until January 1, 2005. For 2004, we estimate ﬁve-year 
adjustable rates from a statistical model using the one-year adjustable rate and thirty-year ﬁxed rate reported by 
Freddie Mac and the one- and ﬁve-year rates for Treasury securities.  
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larger.  Thus, the gap between the APRs on ﬁxed- and adjustable-rate loans, which was 
substantial at the beginning of 2004, had been virtually eliminated by early 2005; then the 
relationship between the two loan types inverted, with APRs on adjustable-rate loans 
somewhat higher than those on thirty-year fixed-rate loans during most of 2005 and all of 
2006.  The ﬁnding suggests that, as an artifact of regulation, geographic areas may have 
shown differing incidences of higher-priced lending over the past three years merely because 
they had differing shares of ﬁxed-rate versus adjustable-rate loans.  That is, areas with larger 
shares of adjustable-rate loans likely had fewer higher-priced loans than areas with larger 
shares of ﬁxed-rate loans in 2004. This effect should have reversed over the course of 2005 
and throughout 2006 as APRs on adjustable-rate loans moved above those on ﬁxed-rate 
loans.   
  In the analysis of the 2005 HMDA data, we used information on the mix of 
adjustable- and fixed-rate loans for each state to derive a rough approximation of the 
differential effect of the flattening of the yield curve on the proportion of adjustable-rate and 
fixed-rate loans that exceeded the HMDA price-reporting thresholds.
29  The analysis 
indicated that states with higher levels of adjustable-rate lending had both relatively low 
levels of higher-priced lending in 2004 and larger increases in such lending from 2004 to 
2005, a pattern that would have been predicted from the narrowing of the APR gap between 
adjustable- and fixed-rate loans.  
The data illustrated in figure 2 suggest that the relative mix of adjustable- and fixed-
rate mortgages should be related to changes in the incidence of higher-priced lending 
between 2005 and 2006, although the differences between these two years are substantially 
smaller than those between 2004 and 2005.  The data bear this out for home-purchase loans, 
                                                 
29 The mix of adjustable- and fixed-rate loans was derived from data obtained from First American 
LoanPerformance, www.loanperformance.com. 2006 HMDA Data  -33-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
although the effects are very mild.  States with the highest proportion of adjustable-rate 
mortgages showed a greater increase in the incidence of higher-priced lending than other 
states (table 10).  The pattern for refinancings was not consistent:  The states with the largest 
share of adjustable-rate mortgages showed about an average increase in the incidence of 
higher-priced lending, which suggests that other factors, such as opportunities to extract 
equity, played a more dominant role in explaining differences between 2005 and 2006 in the 
incidence of higher-priced lending for refinancings.  The role of these factors is discussed 
below.   
Above, we estimated that if all loans were fixed rate, then the effects of the flattening 
of the yield curve would have been to add approximately 2 percentage points to the reported 
incidence of higher-priced lending to first-lien loans in the 2006 HMDA data.  The mix of 
adjustable-rate loan types is unknown.  Depending upon the mix, we estimate that the yield-
curve effect on the reported incidence on adjustable-rate loans would have been on the order 
of 4 or 5 percentage points.  Thus, depending upon the overall mix of fixed- and adjustable-
rate loans, the effect of the yield curve flattening on the incidence of higher-priced loans 
would have been to increase the incidence on the order of 3 or 4 percentage points.  This 
implies that had there been no yield-curve changes, the incidence of higher-priced home-
purchase loans would have fallen and the incidence for refinancings would have shown only 
a modest increase.  
 
Real Effects on the Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending 
To the degree that changes in the incidence of higher-priced lending are caused by yield-
curve effects, they are not, to that extent, a result of any changes in the business practices of 2006 HMDA Data  -34-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
lenders nor in the credit-risk proﬁles or preferences of consumers.
30  It is difficult to gauge 
the importance of the latter two factors in explaining changes in the ‘‘real’’ incidence of 
higher-priced lending over time.   
The housing market, and economic conditions more generally, were favorable in the 
2004–05 period.  Sales of both new and existing homes in 2005 eclipsed the historic highs 
reached in 2004.  Housing market conditions began moderating in 2006:  For the year, home 
prices rose more slowly in many areas and declined in some others.  Nationally, the median 
price for existing homes increased throughout 2005, reached a high in July 2006, and then 
fell over the remainder of the year.  Overall, the median price of existing homes ended up 
higher in 2006 than 2005.  In addition, a steady climb in short-term interest rates pushed up 
rates and monthly payments for some existing borrowers with adjustable-rate loans and for 
those taking out new such loans.
31  Thus, nationally, housing affordability fell from 2005 to 
2006, which suggests that more borrowers may have had to stretch financially to purchase or 
refinance the mortgages on their homes.
32   
Moreover, higher interest rates altered the mix of individuals seeking to refinance 
their loans.  Historically, individuals have refinanced their loans for one or both of the 
following reasons:  to lower the interest rate on the debt or to extract some of the 
accumulated equity in their home.  The latter purpose (sometimes referred to as cash-out 
refinancing) is accomplished by borrowing more than is needed to cover the closing costs of 
the new loan plus the existing balance of the old loan.  Increases in interest rates during 2005 
                                                 
 
30 As discussed in the preceding section, the yield-curve effects are an artifact of the Regulation C 
deﬁnition of a higher-priced loan and the specification in Regulation Z of the method of calculating APRs 
(particularly for adjustable-rate loans) 
31 Because many adjustable-rate loans have an initial period at a fixed rate (often two or three years 
from loan origination), some borrowers with such loans do not experience an immediate change in their 
payments if interest rates increase.  For new borrowers, an increase in short-term rates generally results in a 
corresponding increase in the initial rate on the loan.  
32 Information on the sales, prices, and affordability of homes is in U. S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Affairs, U.S. Housing Market Conditions, www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc.html. 2006 HMDA Data  -35-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
and the first part of 2006 reduced the opportunities for individuals to benefit from rate-
reduction refinancings, so the proportion of borrowers in the refinance market who were 
seeking equity extraction likely rose in 2006.
33   
The less-favorable conditions in the housing market and in the interest rate 
environment in 2006 undoubtedly account for much of the decline in the number of mortgage 
originations reported in the HMDA data for 2006, particularly with regard to the sharp 
decline in refinancings (about 15 percent).  It also likely explains the increase from 2005 in 
the proportion of borrowers who obtained higher-priced loans in the market for refinancings.  
The rise in the incidence of higher-priced lending in the refinance market (particularly when 
compared with the home-purchase market) seems to have come primarily from the 
aforementioned rise in the proportion of borrowers in the refinance market who were seeking 
to raise cash—and equity extraction is a major reason for borrowers in the higher-priced 
segment market to refinance.
34  In short, the increase in the incidence of higher-priced 
lending in the refinance market, at least relative to the home-purchase market, appears to 
have been driven mainly by a decrease in the number of prime borrowers in this market 
rather than by an increase in borrowers with weaker credit profiles. 
Industry data provide additional support for the view that real credit quality declined 
from 2005 to 2006, albeit modestly.  However, most of the change in credit quality seems to 
have taken place in the near-prime, or ‘‘alt-A,’’ portion of the market.  For example, 
                                                 
33 Data published by Freddie Mac indicate that the share of refinancings involving cash-outs rose 
steadily over the course of 2005 and through the third quarter of 2006 
(www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/refi_archives.htm). 
34 This conclusion follows from the belief that the credit profiles of those extracting equity are, in 
general, worse than those that refinance purely to benefit from interest rate reductions.  Empirical evidence on 
delinquency rates for refinancings involving equity extraction is generally consistent with this belief.  However, 
in areas that have experienced exceptional increases in home values, the expected credit profiles of those 
extracting equity may not be worse than others because such borrowers may benefit from relatively low loan-to-
value ratios.  That condition may explain, for example, the relatively low incidence of higher-priced lending for 
refinancing in California (table 10), a state with a high incidence of higher-priced lending for home purchases.  
California had among the largest increases in home values of any state in recent years. 2006 HMDA Data  -36-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
estimates show that from 2005 to 2006, the subprime share of all mortgage originations held 
steady at about 20 percent, whereas, over the same period, the alt-A portion of the market 
rose from 12.2 percent to 13.4 percent.
35  
 
DIFFERENCES IN LENDING OUTCOMES BY RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEX OF 
BORROWER  
One purpose of the HMDA data is to allow comparisons of lending outcomes across 
borrowers grouped by their race, ethnicity, or sex.  Three types of outcomes often assessed 
are the incidence of higher-priced lending, the spreads paid by those with higher-priced 
loans, and denial rates.  Analysis of the 2004 and 2005 HMDA data found that differences 
across groups in mean spreads paid by those with higher-priced loans were generally small.  
However, the analysis revealed substantial differences across racial and ethnic lines in the 
incidence of higher-priced lending and in denial rates; further, it showed that such differences 
could not be fully explained by factors included in the HMDA data.   
In examining 2006 lending outcomes by the race, ethnicity, and sex of borrowers, the 
present analysis focuses on (1) home-purchase loans and (2) reﬁnancing loans that, in either 
case, are conventional first liens on owner-occupied, one- to four-family, site-built homes.  
Those two loan categories represent, by far, the largest number of reported mortgages in the 
HMDA data:
 
 For 2006, the home-purchase category comprised 6.2 million applications and 
3.9 million loans, and the reﬁnancing category comprised 10.4 million applications and 4.3 
million loans (table 4).  
Although the HMDA data do not include many of the factors directly considered by 
lenders in credit underwriting and pricing, the data do include some borrower-related items 
that are likely related to the loan underwriting and pricing process.  Among these borrower-
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related items are property location, income relied on in underwriting, loan amount, time of 
year when the loan was made, and presence of a co-applicant.  Because of the focus here on 
speciﬁc loan product categories, the analysis already accounts in broad terms for loan type 
and purpose, type of property securing the loan, lien status, and owner-occupancy status.   
In comparing lending outcomes across racial and ethnic groups, one can match for the 
sex of the applicant and co-applicant.  Accounting for sex in the analysis is intended to better 
distinguish pricing issues related purely to the race or ethnicity of the borrower from those 
that could be related to sex.  In assessing lending outcomes by sex, one can match for race 
and ethnicity, once again to make comparisons as precise as possible. 
The pricing analysis here focuses on both the incidence of higher-priced lending and 
the mean APR spreads paid by borrowers with higher-priced loans.  Comparisons of these 
outcomes are made across eleven groups—nine racial or ethnic groups and the two sexes.  
Comparisons of average outcomes for each group are made both before and after modifying 
the results for (1) differences in the borrower-related factors cited earlier and (2) differences 
in the borrower-related factors plus the speciﬁc lending institution used by the borrower.
36  
Excluded from the pricing analysis are applicants residing outside the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia and applications deemed to be business related.   The method of 
controlling for these factors is to gather borrower data into cells or groupings in which 
borrowers in each cell are similar along the dimensions considered.  The methodology used 
here is the same as that described in the previously cited 2005 and 2006 Federal Reserve 
Bulletin articles assessing, respectively, the 2004 and 2005 HMDA data. 
 
 
Comparisons for lending outcomes across groups are of three types:  gross 
(“unmodiﬁed”), modiﬁed to account for borrower-related factors (‘‘borrower modiﬁed’’), 
                                                 
36 To recall, the borrower-related factors are income, loan amount, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
of the property, presence of a co-applicant, and (in the comparisons by race and ethnicity) sex. 2006 HMDA Data  -38-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
and modiﬁed for borrower- related factors plus lender (‘‘borrower-plus-lender modiﬁed’’).  
For purposes of presentation, the borrower-modified and borrower-plus-lender-modiﬁed 
outcomes shown in the tables are normalized so that, for the base comparison group (non-
Hispanic whites in the case of comparison by race and ethnicity, and males in the case of 
comparison by sex), the mean at each modiﬁcation level is the same as the gross mean.  
Consequently, the borrower-modified and borrower-plus-lender-modiﬁed outcomes for any 
other group represent the expected average outcome if the members of that group had the 
same distribution of control factors as that of the base comparison group.  
 
Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending by Race and Ethnicity 
The 2006 HMDA data, like the 2004 and 2005 data, indicate that black and Hispanic 
borrowers are more likely, and Asians borrowers less likely, to obtain loans with prices 
above the HMDA pricing reporting thresholds than are non-Hispanic white borrowers.  
These relationships are found for both home-purchase loans and refinancings (table 11).
37  
Gross differences in the incidence of higher-priced lending between non-Hispanic whites, on 
the one hand, and blacks or Hispanic whites, on the other, are large, but borrower-plus-
lender-modified differences are substantially reduced.  Most of the reduction in the 
difference in the incidence across groups comes from adding the control for lender to the 
control for borrower-related factors, an indication that the pricing differences in a given 
lender’s underwriting are typically smaller than the differences among loans across lenders.
  
                                                 
 
37 Applicants are placed under only one category for race and ethnicity, generally according to the race 
and ethnicity of the person listed first on the application. However, under race, the application is designated as 
joint if one applicant reported the single designation of white and the other reported one or more minority races. 
If the application is not joint but more than one race is reported, the following designations are made: If at least 
two minority races are reported, the application is designated as two or more minority races; if the first person 
listed on an application reports two races, and one is white, the application is categorized under the minority 
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For home-purchase loans in 2006, the gross mean incidence of higher-priced lending 
was 53.7 percent for blacks and 17.7 percent for non-Hispanic whites, a difference of 36.0 
percentage points (table 11, top panel).  Borrower-related factors included in the HMDA data 
accounted for about one-sixth of the unmodified difference.  Controlling further for lender 
reduces the remaining gap to 12.6 percentage points.  In comparison, in 2005, the unmodiﬁed 
mean incidence of higher-priced lending for such loans was 54.7 percent for blacks and 17.2 
percent for non-Hispanic whites, a difference of 37.5 percentage points.  For 2005, borrower-
related factors accounted for about one-fifth of the unmodified difference, and controlling 
further for borrower and lender reduced the remaining gap to 10 percentage points, a 
somewhat smaller “unexplained” difference than that found in the 2006 data.  
For reﬁnancings in 2006, the unmodified difference between blacks and non-Hispanic 
whites was 27.1 percentage points, and the borrower-plus-lender-related difference was 7.3 
percentage points; once again, most of the reduction in differences came from the addition of 
the control for lender (table 11, bottom panel).  In comparison, in 2005, the unmodified 
difference in incidence between blacks and non-Hispanic whites was 28.3 percentage points, 
and the borrower-plus-lender-related difference was 6.2 percentage points.  As in 2006, most 
of the reduction in 2005 came from the addition of the control for lender.  Relationships are 
similar when comparisons are made between Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic whites.  
However, the unmodified difference in the incidence of higher-priced lending between these 
two groups (12 percentage points in 2006) is notably smaller than between blacks and non-
Hispanic whites, and much of the difference is accounted for once borrower-related factors 
and lender are taken into account. 
The situation for Asians differs greatly from that for blacks or Hispanic whites: 
Compared with non-Hispanic whites, Asians had a lower unmodified mean incidence of 2006 HMDA Data  -40-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
higher-priced lending in 2006 for home-purchase and reﬁnance loans.  Borrower-related 
factors plus lender do not alter the gap in incidence but narrow it for refinancings.  
 
Rate Spreads by Race and Ethnicity 
The 2006 data indicate that among borrowers with higher-priced loans, the unmodified mean 
prices paid by black borrowers are moderately higher, and those paid by Hispanic white 
borrowers are slightly higher, than those paid by non-Hispanic white borrowers (table 12).  
Asian borrowers with higher-priced loans paid about the same price, on average, as non-
Hispanic whites with higher-priced loans. These relationships are generally consistent for 
both types of loans and are little influenced by borrower-related factors or the specific lender 
used by the borrowers.   
Pricing Differences by Sex  
The 2006 HMDA data, like those in previous years, reveal little difference in pricing 
outcomes by sex.   For example, sole female borrowers generally have a slightly lower 
incidence of higher-priced lending than sole male borrowers for home-purchase loans both 
before and after accounting for borrower-related factors plus lender (table 11).  Similarly, the 
average spreads paid by females are virtually the same as those paid by males after 
accounting for the presence or absence of a co-borrower (table 12). 
 
Denial Rates by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex 
Analyses of the HMDA data from earlier years has consistently found that denial rates vary 
by applicant race and ethnicity.  For the 2006 home-purchase and refinance loans examined 
here on an unmodified basis, American Indians, blacks, and Hispanic whites had higher 2006 HMDA Data  -41-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
denial rates than non-Hispanic whites; blacks had the highest rates; and Hispanic whites had 
rates between those for blacks and those for non-Hispanic whites.  The pattern was less 
consistent for Asians, who had higher denial rates than non-Hispanic whites for home 
purchase, but lower rates for refinancings (table 13). 
For home-purchase lending, controlling for borrower-related factors in the HMDA 
data reduces the differences in denial rates among racial and ethnic groups.  Accounting for 
the speciﬁc lender used by the applicant almost always reduces differences further, although 
unexplained differences remain between non-Hispanic whites and other racial and ethnic 
groups.  For example, for home-purchase loans, the gross mean denial rate was 31.6 percent 
for blacks and 13.1 percent for non-Hispanic whites, a difference of 18.5 percentage points 
(table 13).  Borrower-related factors reduce the difference about 4 percentage points, and 
lender adjustment further reduces the gap to 8.4 percentage points.  The reduction for 
reﬁnance loans is similar, although unmodified differences in denial rates tend to be smaller.  
The gross difference between denial rates for blacks and non-Hispanic whites for 
reﬁnancings is 14.3 percentage points, a difference cut about in half by borrower-plus-lender 
adjustment.  
With regard to the sex of applicants, sole male applicants have nearly the same denial 
rate as sole females.  For home-purchase loans, co-applicants, whether male or female, have 
somewhat lower denial rates than single individuals.   
Limitations of the Data on Differences across Groups 
The 2006 HMDA data, like those for 2004 and 2005, show that the incidence of 
higher-priced lending for blacks and Hispanic white borrowers is notably greater than for 
non-Hispanic whites and, for Asians, that the incidence is fairly close to that for non-2006 HMDA Data  -42-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Hispanic whites. The borrower-plus-lender adjustment, discussed above, is insufficient to 
account fully for racial or ethnic differences in the incidence of higher-priced lending; 
signiﬁcant differences remain unexplained.  Similar patterns are shown in racial and ethnic 
differences in denial rates.  By contrast, only small differences across groups were found in 
the mean spreads paid by those receiving higher-priced loans.  Regarding the sex of 
borrowers, only small differences were found in lending outcomes.   
  In our analysis of the racial, ethnic, and sex differences in the 2005 HMDA data on 
the incidence of higher-priced lending and spreads paid by those with higher-priced loans, we 
presented differences across groups in two ways:  (1) gross differences and (2) differences 
after adjusting the APRs to remove the effects of the flattening of the yield curve.  Here, for 
2006, we present only the gross differences; results with adjusted APRs are similar to the 
gross differences; but the implied racial and ethnic group differences in incidence between 
2005 and 2006 with adjusted APRs are smaller than the gross differences.  For example, 
controlling for borrower-related factors plus lender, the gap in the incidence of higher-priced 
lending between black and non-Hispanic white home-purchase borrowers rose from 10.0 
percentage points to 12.6 percentage points between 2005 and 2006; the comparable 
differences are 9.0 percentage points and 10.5 percentage points when adjusted APRs are 
used.  For refinancings, the adjusted APR gap between blacks and non-Hispanic whites was 
unchanged at 5.6 percentage points in both years, in contrast to unadjusted differences, which 
rose from 6.2 to 7.3 percentage points.  These results suggest that at least a portion of the 
apparent widening of gaps in the incidence of higher-priced lending across racial groups for 
home-purchase lending is due to the further flattening of the yield curve during 2006.  For 
refinancings, the yield-curve effects may explain all of the changes.   2006 HMDA Data  -43-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
The unexplained differences in the incidence of higher-priced lending and in denial 
rates stem, at least in part, from credit-related factors not available in the HMDA data, such 
as measures of credit history (including credit scores), LTV ratios, debt-to-income (DTI) 
ratios, and differences in choice of loan product.  Differential costs of loan origination and 
the competitive environment also likely bear on the differences in pricing; so may differences 
in financial literacy, which can lead to differences in credit-shopping activities and 
negotiating.  Differences in pricing and underwriting outcomes may also reﬂect 
discriminatory treatment of minorities or other actions by lenders, including marketing 
practices.  Further research is needed to assess the extent to which credit- or cost-related 
factors account for the unexplained differences in loan pricing and denial rates. 
 
CREDIT SCORES BY AREA AND HIGHER-PRICED LENDING 
For some time, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board has been using information on the 
credit experiences of consumers as reflected in their credit records and by their credit history 
scores to address public policy and research-related issues.  Some of this research has 
focused on the efficacy of credit scoring and its effects on credit availability and affordability 
for different populations.
38  Other staff research has considered the relationship between 
credit-reporting accuracy and access to credit.
39  Most of this research has been undertaken 
using individual-level nationally representative samples of credit records (with no personally 
identifiable information in the data).  These data include the full range of information 
                                                 
38 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007), Report to the Congress on Credit 
Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit (Washington: Board of Governors, 
August), www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. 
39 For a discussion of credit-reporting accuracy and access to credit and for references to research on 
this subject refer to Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner, “Credit Report Accuracy and Access 
to Credit,” (2004), Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 90 (Summer), pp. 297-322; also Robert B. Avery, Paul S. 
Calem, and Glenn B. Canner (2004), “Consumer Credit Scoring: Do Situational Circumstances Matter,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 28 (April), pp. 835-56. 2006 HMDA Data  -44-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
included in the credit records of these individuals as assembled by TransUnion LLC 
(TransUnion), one of the three national credit-reporting agencies.
40 
  A second type of credit-record-related information has also been used:  summary 
statistics about the credit scores of individuals aggregated at the census-tract level.
41  These 
data, also provided by TransUnion, include, for each census tract, information on the mean 
credit scores and the distribution of credit scores for individuals with an outstanding 
mortgage and for other individuals for whom TransUnion could calculate a credit score.  The 
statistics were constructed by TransUnion using their TransRisk Account Management Score 
(TransRisk Score).
42  The data also include the percentage of individuals who have a credit 
record but could not be scored at the time the data were assembled, most often because their 
credit accounts were not sufficiently numerous or did not show enough recent activity to 
calculate a TransRisk Score.  The thresholds selected for the different segments of the credit 
score distribution correspond roughly to the cutoffs that, based on credit scores alone, would 
place individuals in the prime, near-prime, and subprime price ranges.  The census-tract 
credit-score data are constructed from the credit records of approximately 27 million 
anonymous individuals drawn from stratified, nationally representative random samples of 
all the credit records maintained by TransUnion.
43  
  With the geographic identifiers included in each data file, the census-tract credit score 
can be combined with the HMDA data and with information from the 2000 decennial census.  
For the analysis here, credit scores by census tract (not scores of individuals separately) were 
                                                 
40 Refer to www.transunion.com.  The other two national credit-reporting agencies are Equifax, 
www.equifax.com; and Experian, www.experian.com. 
41 Refer to Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, “Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data.” 
42 The TransRisk Scores were generated by TransUnion using their proprietary model for assessing the 
credit risk of existing credit accounts.  TransRisk Account Management Score is a registered trademark of 
TransUnion LLC; other trademarks, service marks, and brands referred to in this article are the property of their 
respective owners. 
43 Information on census tract was not available for all individuals.  2006 HMDA Data  -45-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
obtained for two specific dates:  December 31, 2004, and December 31, 2005.
44  Given the 
large proportion of all outstanding mortgages originated in just the past few years, the 
census-tract credit-score data for mortgage holders are likely quite representative of the 
individuals who received a mortgage over this period.
45  
 
National Distribution of Credit Scores 
The analysis here uses the 2005 file of credit scores by census tract because its information is 
the nearest in time to the 2006 HMDA data and because it is likely a reasonable 
approximation of the credit scores of individuals taking out mortgages during 2006.  
Nationally, about 15 percent of individuals with a credit record were unscorable; about 19 
percent of individuals had a mortgage, and 66 percent did not (table 14, memo items).
46  The 
distribution of credit scores differs for mortgage borrowers and others:  Overall, about 80 
percent of individuals with a mortgage, but only about 61 percent of other individuals with a 
credit score, had relatively high credit scores, that is, scores that (everything else being equal) 
would make them eligible for the most attractive interest rates available for home loans.  At 
the other end of the spectrum, about 10 percent of mortgage borrowers and 28 percent of 
other individuals who could be scored had relatively low credit scores, that is, scores that 
                                                 
44 The census-tract credit scores do not provide information about the specific credit score that may 
have been used to assess the credit risk of any individual mortgage borrower included in the HMDA data; that 
information is proprietary to the lender and is not reported under HMDA.  Also, the samples of credit records 
drawn in 2004 and 2005 were chosen randomly and do not necessarily include the same individuals. 
45 As of December 2006, according to data from First American LoanPerformance, about 80 percent of 
outstanding first-lien mortgages had been originated in 2003 or later (www.loanperformance.com). 
46 Virtually everyone in the database who had a record of an outstanding mortgage had a credit score.  
However, although some individuals with credit scores were likely unscorable at the time they took out their 
mortgage loan, they became scorable as their credit records “thickened” with the reports of payments on their 
mortgages.  The proportion of individuals that are unscorable depends on the credit-scoring model.  Model 
builders differ on the criteria used to determine scorability.  One difficulty reconciling these shares with other 
data sources is that credit records are for individuals, whereas the household is the unit of analysis typically 
used in statistics on homeownership and mortgage holding. 2006 HMDA Data  -46-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
(everything else being equal) would be consistent with placement in the subprime loan 
market.   
 
Distribution of Credit Scores across Census Tracts 
The broad differences in the distribution of credit scores for mortgage borrowers and other 
individuals, noted above, hold across census tracts grouped along a variety of socioeconomic 
dimensions.
47  However, the distributions of scores differ across census tracts grouped by 
relative income and racial or ethnic composition.  Individuals in higher-income census tracts 
(in which median family income is 120 percent or more of the broader area median) tend to 
have higher credit scores than individuals in other areas.  These patterns hold both for the 
population of individuals with a mortgage and for others.   For example, on average, 88 
percent of scorable individuals with a mortgage who resided in higher-income census tracts 
had relatively high credit scores, as did 74 percent of other individuals.  By comparison, 59 
percent of the mortgage borrowers who could be scored who resided in low-income census 
tracts had relatively high credit scores, as did 35 percent of other individuals (who could be 
scored) in low-income census tracts.  Also, the proportion of individuals in higher-income 
census tracts who were unscorable was notably smaller than that of individuals in low-
income areas—9 percent and 28 percent respectively.   
  The distribution of credit scores also differs across census tracts sorted by the 
proportion of census-tract population that is minority.  In predominantly nonminority census 
tracts (less than 10 percent minority population), about 83 percent of the mortgage borrowers 
                                                 
47 Census tracts differ along a range of socioeconomic metrics.  In part, these differences are by design 
as one of the objectives in defining census tract boundaries is to group smaller geographic areas that have 
similar population and economic circumstances.  According to the Census Bureau, census tracts usually have a 
population of between 2,500 and 8,000 and, when first delineated, are designed to be homogeneous with respect 
to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions (www.census.gov). 2006 HMDA Data  -47-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
and 70 percent of others with a credit score had relatively high credit scores.  In census tracts 
with a minority population exceeding 80 percent, 62 percent of the mortgage borrowers and 
39 percent of others with a credit score had relatively high credit scores.  Once again, the 
percentage of individuals without a credit score differs greatly across census-tract groupings.  
In predominantly nonminority areas, 10 percent of the individuals could not be assigned a 
credit score; in contrast, 24 percent of the individuals in census tracts with more than 80 
percent minority individuals were unscorable.   
  Note that in considering differences for credit scores across census tracts grouped by 
racial or ethnic makeup, differences in score arise solely from differences in the content of 
credit records; so, for example, two individuals of different races or ethnicities but with 
identical credit records will receive identical credit scores.  No information on location, race 
or ethnicity, sex, or other personal demographic characteristic is used in calculating generic 
credit history scores, such as the TransRisk Score.
48 
  
Distribution of Credit Scores across Counties 
The data on credit scores by census tract can be aggregated to higher levels of geography, 
including counties, metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and states.  The South and 
Southwestern sections of the country and portions of the Midwest stand out because they 
have relatively low mean credit scores (figure 3 [figures 3-6 appear after tables]).  By 
contrast, mean scores for mortgage borrowers in the Northeast, in the upper Great Plains, and 
on the West Coast have relatively high mean sores. 
 
                                                 
48 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and 
Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit. 2006 HMDA Data  -48-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Credit Scores and the Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending 
Individuals with lower credit scores are more likely to receive higher-priced loans.
49  
Likewise, the HMDA data show that census tracts with larger shares of individuals who have 
relatively low credit scores and a mortgage also have larger shares of individuals who 
received higher-priced loans (table 15).  For example, in census tracts in which more than 20 
percent of the mortgage borrowers had low credit scores as of the end of 2005, 45 percent of 
the homebuyers in 2006 using conventional first liens to purchase site-built homes or to 
refinance such liens had higher-priced loans; in census tracts in which the share of mortgage 
borrowers with low credit scores was less than 3 percent, the incidence of higher-priced 
lending was only 14 percent.  
  Both the relative income of a census tract and the minority percentage are associated 
with the incidence of higher-priced lending (table 14).  Further analysis (not shown in tables) 
indicates that the incidence of higher-priced lending across census tracts (after accounting for 
the income and racial or ethnic composition of the census tract) can be further explained by 
census-tract data on mean credit scores and on the proportion of individuals with credit 
scores in the categories roughly corresponding to the near-prime and subprime markets.  For 
example, consider arraying census tracts into quintiles ranked by relative income, and, within 
each quintile, further subdividing tracts by mean credit score:  The census tracts with lower 
mean credit scores have a higher incidence of higher-priced lending in the 2006 data (by 
about 4 percentage points) than census tracts with the same income level but higher mean 
credit scores.  A similar relationship is found when census tracts are grouped by minority 
percentage or when the analysis is restricted to non-Hispanic whites. 
                                                 
49 For example, refer to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on 
the Effects of Credit Scoring on the Availability and Affordability of Credit. 
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LOAN PERFORMANCE AND THE HMDA DATA  
As of this writing, conditions in the mortgage market are the subject of considerable concern.  
Delinquency and foreclosure rates have risen substantially, particularly in the higher-priced 
segment of the market, and lax underwriting is widely believed to have contributed to the rise 
in defaults.  Also, a significant share of the higher-priced loans apparently involve adjustable 
rates; such loans carry the potential to significantly increase monthly payments and, hence, to 
place greater burdens on many mortgage borrowers.   
  Although the HMDA data are limited, they can be combined with other data to better 
understand the linkages between loan pricing, economic factors, and mortgage loan 
performance.  We pursue such an analysis here, focusing on variations in rates of serious 
delinquency (payment overdue for ninety days or more) on mortgages across MSA counties.  
Specifically, we examine the relationship between the rates of serious delinquency on 
mortgages as of March 31, 2007, and (1) the incidence of higher-priced lending (from the 
HMDA data) for 2005 and 2006 and (2) county-level economic indicators measured over the 
2002–06 period. 
  The analysis employs a proprietary database, TrenData, that measures loan 
performance at a reasonably disaggregated geographic level.
50  TrenData is based on the 
credit records of individuals, which makes it one of the most comprehensive databases on the 
performance of mortgages.  In particular, the information has been drawn from the credit 
records of a geographically stratified random sample of about 30 million individuals for each 
calendar quarter since 1992.  The data (available by county, MSA, and state and for the 
nation as a whole) include more than 200 measures of credit use and loan performance, 
                                                 
50 TrenData is a registered trademark of TransUnion LLC (http://products.trendatatu.com/faqs.asp). 2006 HMDA Data  -50-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
including the proportion of mortgage borrowers in a county that are at least ninety days 
delinquent on their mortgages.
51  
  Using TrenData we mapped mortgage delinquency rates by MSA county (figure 4).  
MSA counties are grouped into quintiles ranked by their rate of serious mortgage 
delinquency as of March 31, 2007.  The counties vary considerably in their levels of problem 
loans, although most areas have rates of serious delinquency that are relatively low.  Only 5 
percent of the counties have a serious delinquency rate greater than 3 percent, and more than 
one-third have a serious delinquency rate below 1 percent.  Areas of the country with the 
highest levels of serious delinquency are broad sections of the Midwest, including Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, and western Pennsylvania; sections of the south Atlantic region; the Gulf 
Coast area; and portions of Texas, Oklahoma and Colorado.  
  We also mapped the 2006 HMDA data on the incidence of higher-priced lending by 
MSA county (figure 5).  A comparison of figure 4 with figure 5 is revealing.  For the most 
part, MSA counties with elevated rates of higher-priced lending also have elevated rates of 
serious mortgage delinquency.  Notable exceptions in one direction are some counties in 
Florida, California, and the middle Atlantic region that are in the top quintile of the incidence 
of higher-priced lending but that have relatively moderate levels of serious delinquency.
52  
Notable exceptions in the other direction are many of the counties in Michigan, Indiana, 
Ohio, Colorado, western Pennsylvania, and the south Atlantic region, which have high levels 
                                                 
51 All lenders selling their loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must report loan performance to the 
three national credit-reporting agencies.  Virtually all banking institutions also report loan performance on the 
loans they service or hold in portfolio.  Coverage of other loans, such as those from smaller lenders or seller 
financings, are less likely to be reported.   
52 Although these areas have average or lower levels of serious delinquency, they are all in the top 
quintile when measured by the increase in rates of serious delinquency from the last quarter of 2004 through the 
first quarter of 2007.  2006 HMDA Data  -51-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
of mortgage delinquency but are not in the highest quintile of the incidence of higher-priced 
lending.
53    
  In general, we expect both loan pricing and delinquency to be driven by economic 
factors.  Unfortunately, few high-frequency measures of economic conditions are available at 
the county level.  Available items include the unemployment rate, per capita income, house-
price appreciation, and population growth; credit scores and other information drawn from 
credit records are also available.  Each of these factors may influence loan performance and 
the incidence of higher-priced lending, but no single factor stands out.  Consequently, for our 
analysis, we construct a composite of economic factors (by regressing the TrenData 
delinquency measure of loan performance against several county-level indicators) as a 
representative measure of economic circumstances.
54   
The coefficient weights from this regression are used to form the composite economic 
variable used here.  This variable can also be viewed as the expectation—based only on the 
economic factors described above—of the rate of serious mortgage delinquency for the first 
quarter of 2007.  As expected, each of the factors included in the regression played a role in 
predicting future mortgage loan performance.  The most important factor, however, was 
house-price appreciation, particularly from 2004 to 2006.
55   
                                                 
53 Not that the delinquency rates presented here are for only a single point in time—March 31, 2007—
and some areas of the country that have had relatively low rates of serious delinquency have been experiencing 
sharp increases in those rates more recently.   
54  The composite measure is constructed by regressing the TrenData delinquency measure of loan 
performance against the following county-level economic factors:  the unemployment rates in 2005 and 2006 
and the change in the unemployment rate from 2002 to 2005; the rates of house price appreciation from 2001 to 
2004 and from 2004 to 2006; the level of per capita income in 2005 and the change in per capita income from 
2002 to 2005; the population growth rate from 2002 to 2005; and the mean credit score of mortgage holders and 
the percentage of mortgage holders in the two lowest score groupings as described earlier, all measured at the 
end of 2004.  We also include the average share of HMDA loans to non-owner occupants in each county in 
2005 and 2006 as a measure of the importance of investor activity.  House price appreciation information is 
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (www.ofheo.gov); data on unemployment rates are 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov); and per capita income and population growth are from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov).  
55 The R-squared value for the regression was 0.40. 2006 HMDA Data  -52-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
Figure 6 shows counties grouped by our composite economic variable.  The counties 
are grouped by their expected level of delinquency, applying the same cutoffs used for the 
actual delinquency rates in figure 4.  Not surprisingly, the patterns in figures 4 and 6 show a 
high degree of correlation.  There are some exceptions:  most counties in Colorado, for 
example, have higher levels of serious mortgage delinquency than would be expected on the 
basis of economic factors as measured here, and counties in Florida generally have lower-
than-expected rates.  
 
FURTHER ANALYSIS RELATING  
HIGHER-PRICED LENDING TO LOAN PERFORMANCE 
The analysis in the previous section does not explicitly link the HMDA data on the incidence 
of higher-priced lending to mortgage loan performance.  The figures show similar patterns 
for the incidence of higher-priced lending; the economic composite variable and mortgage 
delinquency rates are suggestive, but they do not identify whether loan pricing data have 
additional power in predicting delinquency once economic factors are taken into account.  To 
focus on this issue, we estimated a regression similar to that used to create the economic 
composite described above.  But we added to the regression a variable reflecting the average 
incidence of higher-priced lending on mortgage loans reported in the 2005 and 2006 HMDA 
data for each county.  Other variables were added to reflect the percentage of subprime and 
prime loans made in each state that had adjustable interest rates (as derived from the First 
American LoanPerformance data on mortgages). 
Results suggest that the incidence of higher-priced lending has independent predictive 
value for loan performance beyond that of the economic factors.  All else being equal, an 
increase in the incidence of higher-priced lending of 1 percentage point implies an increase in 2006 HMDA Data  -53-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
the rate of serious mortgage delinquency of 0.03 percentage point.   Although the effect may 
seem small, it is, in fact, fairly large given the relatively low level of mortgage delinquency.  
For example, a county with the median level of serious delinquency (1.27 percent) 
experiencing an increase in the incidence of higher-priced lending of 10 percentage points, 
holding economic factors constant, would generally be enough to move a county to the next 
highest quintile of counties ordered by loan delinquency.  This relationship between the 
incidence of higher-priced lending and the rate of serious delinquency is robust and of a 
similar magnitude when the change in delinquency rates between 2004 and 2007 is predicted 
rather than the level of serious delinquency at the end the period.  Finally, some evidence 
indicates that higher levels of adjustable-rate mortgages are associated with higher levels of 
future loan delinquency, but the effect is small and is found only for prime mortgages.  
However, the data available here cannot identify which types of mortgages within an area are 
delinquent.  It may be that adjustable-rate mortgages are more prone to delinquency, but their 
delinquency status is not reflected in the aggregated data used in this study.  Also, some 
evidence indicates that delinquencies in adjustable-rate mortgages are a growing problem 
that may not be fully reflected in the delinquency rates for March 2007.  
  The statistical relationship between the incidence of higher-priced lending and future 
loan performance could be caused by several factors.  There may be a direct effect:  The 
higher monthly payments associated with higher-priced lending are a greater burden on 
borrowers and lead to greater delinquency.  It also may be the case that the statistical 
association we measure reflects the effects of other economic factors, which we were not 
able to include in our model and that are related both to higher rates of delinquency and to 2006 HMDA Data  -54-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
higher-priced lending.
56  Such factors may include expected changes in home prices, 
foreclosure laws, the specific types of loans used to buy homes or refinance, and other factors 
used in underwriting and pricing loans. 
Our analysis is largely suggestive and is relatively parsimonious.  However, it does 
suggest that the pricing data in HMDA may be a useful source of information in 
understanding and predicting loan performance.   
                                                 
56  Additional analysis shows that the economic factors and the incidence of higher-priced lending are 
highly correlated.  A regression relating the incidence of higher-priced lending in 2005 and 2006 with the 
economic factors included in the economic composite variables had an R-squared value of about 0.67. 2006 HMDA Data  -55-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
 
APPENDIX: REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATION C  
Under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), lenders use a ‘‘loan/application 
register’’ (HMDA/ LAR) to report information annually to their federal supervisory agencies 
for each application and loan acted on during the calendar year.  Lenders must make their 
HMDA/LARs available to the public by March 31 following the year to which the data 
relate, and they must remove the two date-related ﬁelds to help preserve applicants’ privacy.
52  
Only lenders that have offices (or, for nondepository institutions, are deemed to have 
offices) in metropolitan areas are required to report under HMDA.  However, if a lender is 
required to report, it must report information on all of its home loan applications and loans in 
all locations, including nonmetropolitan areas.    
The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation C requires lenders to report the following 
information on home-purchase and home-improvement loans and on the reﬁnancing of such 
loans:  
For each application or loan  
•  application date and the date an action was taken on the application  
•  action taken on the application  
  — approved and originated  
  — approved but not accepted by the applicant  
  — denied (with the reasons for denial—voluntary for some lenders)  
  — withdrawn by the applicant  
 —  ﬁle closed for incompleteness  
•  pre-approval program used (for home-purchase loans only)  
•  loan amount 
•  loan type  
  — conventional  
  — insured by the Federal Housing Administration  
  — guaranteed by the Veterans Administration  
  — backed by the Farm Service Agency or Rural Housing Service  
•  pre-approval status  
•  lien status  
 —  ﬁrst lien  
  — junior lien  
 —  unsecured   
•  loan purpose  
  — home purchase  
 —  reﬁnance  
  — home improvement  
•  type of purchaser (if the lender subsequently sold the loan)  
 
For each applicant or co-applicant  
•  race  
•  ethnicity  
•  sex  
•  income relied on in credit decision 
 2006 HMDA Data  -56-  2006 HMDA Data   
 
For each property  
•  location, by state, county, and census tract 
•  type of structure 
  — one-to four-family dwelling   
 —  manufactured  home   
  — multifamily property (dwelling with ﬁve or more units)  
•  occupancy status (owner occupied or non-owner occupied)  
 
For loans subject to price reporting 
•   spread above comparable treasury security 
 
For loans subject to HOEPA 
•  indicator of whether loan is subject to HOEPA  
 








1990 3.3 1.1 1.2 5.5 1.2 6.7 9,332 24,041
1991 3.3 2.1 1.2 6.6 1.4 7.9 9,358 25,934
1992 3.5 5.2 1.2 10.0 2.0 12.0 9,073 28,782
1993 4.5 7.7 1.4 13.6 1.8 15.4 9,650 35,976
1994 5.2 3.8 1.7 10.7 1.5 12.2 9,858 38,750
1995 5.5 2.7 1.8 10.0 1.3 11.2 9,539 36,611
1996 6.3 4.5 2.1 13.0 1.8 14.8 9,328 42,946
1997 6.8 5.4 2.2 14.3 2.1 16.4 7,925 47,416
1998 8.0 11.4 2.0 21.4 3.2 24.7 7,836 57,294
1999 8.4 9.4 2.1 19.9 3.0 22.9 7,832 56,966
2000 8.3 6.5 2.0 16.8 2.4 19.2 7,713 52,776
2001 7.7 14.3 1.9 23.8 3.8 27.6 7,631 53,066
2002 7.4 17.5 1.5 26.4 4.8 31.2 7,771 56,506
2003 8.2 24.6 1.5 34.3 7.2 41.5 8,121 65,808
2004 9.8 16.1 2.2 28.1 5.1 33.3 8,853 72,246
2005 11.7 15.9 2.5 30.2 5.9 36.0 8,848 78,193
2006 10.9 14.0 2.5 27.5 6.2 33.7 8,886 78,638
Note:  Here and in subsequent tables except table 3, applications exclude requests for pre-approval that were denied by the 
lender or were accepted by the lender but not acted upon by the borrower. In this article, applications are defined as being for a 
loan on a specific property; they are thus distinct from requests for pre-approval, which are not related to a specific property.
1. Applications for multifamily homes are included only in the “total” columns; for 2006, these applications numbered nearly 
52,380. 
2. A report covers the mortgage lending activity of a lender in a single metropolitan statistical area in which it had an office 
during the year.
SOURCE:  Here and in subsequent tables and figures except as noted, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, data 
reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (www.ffiec.gov/hmda).
1. Home loan and reporting activity of home lenders covered under HMDA, 1990-2006
Number 
Year
Applications received for home loans on one- to four-family properties, and 








2006 HMDA Data -57- 2006 HMDA DataType Number Percent
Depository institution
Commercial bank  3,900 43.9
Savings institution  946 10.6





1  676 7.6
All 2,004 22.5
All institutions  8,886 100
     1.  Subsidiary of a depository institution or an affiliate of 
a bank holding company.
2. Distribution of home lenders covered by HMDA, by 
type of institution, 2006































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.1 0.2
49 1.9 3.4 2.3 2.5 0.5 3.9 4.7 4.1 2.1 3.3
74 6.6 12.6 8.1 12.9 3.2 9.8 12.9 10.8 9.7 12.2
99 13.6 23.3 16.0 30.1 10.7 17.1 22.8 18.9 23.4 25.6
124 23.7 34.6 26.5 48.4 21.6 26.2 33.6 28.5 40.0 40.0
149 34.5 44.6 37.1 67.4 36.7 34.7 43.5 37.4 57.5 55.3
174 43.9 52.9 46.2 81.3 52.0 43.4 52.5 46.2 71.4 67.0
199 51.9 59.9 54.0 90.0 64.7 50.7 60.0 53.6 81.4 76.2
224 59.5 66.2 61.2 94.4 74.0 58.0 66.7 60.7 88.4 83.2
249 65.2 71.3 66.7 96.8 81.8 63.5 71.8 66.1 92.3 88.5
274 70.3 75.5 71.6 98.1 87.3 68.8 76.3 71.1 94.9 92.4
299 74.4 79.3 75.6 98.8 91.3 72.9 79.9 75.0 96.5 94.9
324 78.4 82.7 79.5 99.2 94.2 77.0 83.3 79.0 97.6 96.8
349 81.3 85.3 82.3 99.5 96.2 80.0 85.9 81.8 98.4 97.9
374 84.0 87.7 84.9 99.8 97.6 83.0 88.2 84.6 99.6 98.8
399 86.1 89.6 87.0 99.8 98.7 85.3 90.0 86.7 99.7 99.4
417 89.1 91.0 89.6 99.9 99.6 88.5 91.4 89.4 99.8 99.9
449 90.2 92.8 90.9 99.9 99.7 89.8 93.1 90.8 99.9 99.9
499 92.2 95.1 92.9 100.0 99.8 92.1 95.2 93.1 100.0 99.9
549 94.0 96.7 94.7 100.0 99.9 94.0 96.7 94.9 100.0 100.0
599 95.2 97.7 95.8 100.0 100.0 95.3 97.6 96.0 100.0 100.0
649 96.3 98.4 96.8 100.0 100.0 96.4 98.3 97.0 100.0 100.0
699 97.0 98.8 97.5 100.0 100.0 97.2 98.8 97.7 100.0 100.0
749 97.5 99.1 97.9 100.0 100.0 97.6 99.0 98.1 100.0 100.0
799 97.9 99.3 98.3 100.0 100.0 98.0 99.3 98.4 100.0 100.0





Mean 245.8 208.7 236.4 133.0 184.6 245.6 207.5 233.8 150.2 154.1
Median
1 192 165 185 127 171 196 167 186 138 141
VA
     1.  Loan amounts are reported under HMDA to the nearest $1,000.
     FHA  Federal Housing Administration.      VA  Department of Veterans Affairs.
6. Cumulative distribution of home loans, by loan amount and by purpose, type, and pricing of loan, 2006
Upper bound 


















24 2.9 3.6 3.1 5.9 1.0 2.9 4.6 3.5 4.6 3.0
49 22.5 29.3 24.2 50.6 31.0 23.1 33.0 26.2 39.5 31.4
74 46.3 56.1 48.8 83.2 69.2 48.8 62.3 53.0 76.3 69.4
99 64.8 73.9 67.1 94.5 89.2 68.1 79.8 71.8 93.1 88.5
124 76.8 84.3 78.7 97.7 96.6 80.0 88.6 82.7 98.0 96.0
149 83.8 89.9 85.4 98.7 98.8 86.5 92.8 88.5 99.3 98.6
199 91.6 95.7 92.6 99.5 99.8 93.2 96.8 94.3 99.8 99.8
249 94.9 97.6 95.6 99.7 99.9 96.0 98.2 96.6 99.9 100.0
299 96.5 98.4 97.0 99.8 100.0 97.2 98.7 97.7 99.9 100.0









Mean 105.3 86.1 100.5 55.2 66.0 98.6 78.1 92.1 60.1 65.8
Median
1 79 68 76 49 60 76 63 72 56 60
Conforming
Mean 85.3 74.0 82.4 . . . . . . 80.9 67.8 76.7 . . . . . .
Median
1 72 64 70 . . . . . . 70 60 66 . . . . . .
Jumbo
Mean 271.6 212.1 258.8 . . . . . . 234.7 191.0 223.7 . . . . . .
Median
1 199 168 190 . . . . . . 175 150 168 . . . . . .
     
     Note: For loans with two or more applicants, HMDA-covered lenders report data on only two. Income for two applicants is reported jointly.
     1.  Income amounts are reported under HMDA to the nearest $1,000.
     2. By size, all loans backed by the FHA or VA are conforming.
     . . .  Not applicable.
     FHA  Federal Housing Administration.      VA  Department of Veterans Affairs.









FHA VA FHA VA




















     Percent
8. Non-owner-occupied lending 
as a share of all first liens to 
purchase one- to four-family site-
built homes, by number and 
dollar amount of loans, 
1990–2006










Independent mortgage company 50.6 25.5 27.8 52.0 41.4 31.0 45.7 41.5 31.2
Depository 25.9 8.0 45.2 22.8 12.8 43.8 28.5 18.7 43.4
Subsidiary of depository 11.5 9.0 17.9 13.0 20.7 15.5 12.4 22.9 15.4
Affiliate of depository 12.0 18.6 9.1 12.2 30.9 9.7 13.4 37.9 10.1
Total 100 14.0 100 100 24.7 100 100 28.4 100



























Lowest 19.0 0.8 38.3 6.7
Second lowest  20.6 1.4 33.6 5.8
Middle 23.6 1.6 31.8 5.0
Second highest  21.6 -0.1 29.0 5.3
Highest 26.4 4.6 31.2 5.3
Memo: California
1 30.2 1.4 23.3 4.6
Total  24.1 1.9 30.2 5.3
  1.  California is shown separately because it accounts for a large number of loans and has a high incidence of adjustable-
rate lending.
  Note:  Spreads are unadjusted. Quintiles based on share of loans originated in 2006 that had an adjustable rate. For 
definition of higher-priced lending, refer to text.
Quintile of states
Table 10. Incidence of higher-priced lending in states grouped by share of originated loans that had an 
adjustable rate, and the change in incidence, by quintile and type of loan , 2006
Home purchase Refinance










Race other than white only
American Indian or Alaska 
Native 27,766 35.3 29.5 21.8 21,615 34.2 30.5 24.5
Asian 237,383 16.6 15.8 16.6 187,187 16.8 15.3 16.8
Black or African American 312,451 54.7 47.0 27.2 318,650 53.7 47.6 30.3
Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander 23,450 34.8 30.4 21.0 18,773 34.0 29.2 22.9
Two or more minority races 2,112 30.4 28.7 20.8 2,112 27.6 28.6 20.7
Joint 51,881 18.2 23.0 19.0 44,666 17.5 23.8 19.8
Not available 431,159 32.4 33.6 21.6 377,985 29.2 31.8 23.3
White, by ethnicty
Hispanic white 464,634 46.1 34.2 21.9 464,291 46.6 35.1 24.0
Non-Hispanic white 2,789,265 17.2 17.2 17.2 2,406,570 17.7 17.7 17.7
Sex
One male 1,392,947 31.7 31.7 31.7 1,255,567 32.3 32.3 32.3
One female 1,021,006 30.8 29.8 30.8 925,029 30.9 30.2 31.2
Two males 44,278 23.1 23.1 23.1 36,405 23.9 23.9 23.9
Two females 36,140 24.7 22.4 23.9 31,062 26.2 22.5 23.4
Race other than white only
American Indian or Alaska 
Native 37,213 28.9 32.1 24.1 27,748 32.8 36.1 29.5
Asian 165,011 15.2 18.9 21.1 127,873 19.6 23.7 25.3
Black or African American 441,299 49.3 45.0 27.2 397,452 52.8 50.0 33.0
Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander 31,453 28.4 32.2 24.3 24,078 33.6 37.5 30.0
Two or more minority races 3,650 28.6 29.5 24.2 2,913 28.0 28.9 30.8
Joint 61,200 19.3 26.2 22.4 41,875 26.2 33.3 26.9
Not available 752,573 32.2 38.0 24.5 570,431 38.2 43.7 30.6
White, by ethnicty
Hispanic white 478,381 33.8 31.5 23.6 437,163 37.7 37.0 29.7
Non-Hispanic white 3,496,425 21.0 21.0 21.0 2,596,873 25.7 25.7 25.7
Sex
One male 1,424,721 30.3 30.3 30.3 1,197,165 34.6 34.6 34.6
One female 1,229,138 31.1 30.0 30.4 1,033,700 35.3 34.3 34.5
Two males 37,442 21.2 21.2 21.2 27,336 26.6 26.6 26.6
Two females 41,572 27.0 23.5 22.5 31,179 34.1 29.9 26.6
Home purchase
Refinance
     NOTE:  Excludes transition-period loans (those for which the application was submitted before 2004).  For definition of higher-priced lending and 
explanations of spread adjustment and of modification factors, refer to text.  
     1. Categories for race and ethnicity reflect the revised standards established in 1997 by the Office of Management and Budget. For method of 
allocation into racial and ethnic categories and definitions of categories, refer to text note 36.  Loans taken out jointly by a male and female are not 
tabulated here because they would not be directly comparable with loans taken out by one borrower or by two borrowers of the same sex.




11. Incidence of higher-priced lending, unmodified and modified for borrower- and lender-related factors, for conventional 
first liens on owner-occupied one- to four-family site-built homes, by type of loan and by race, ethnicity, and sex of borrower, 
2005 and 2006
Percent except as noted
2005 2006








Modified incidence, by 
modification factor










Race other than white only
American Indian or Alaska Native 9,799 4.6 4.8 4.8 7,388 5.2 5.2 5.2
Asian 39,471 4.6 4.7 4.7 31,395 5.0 5.1 5.1
Black or African American 171,009 5.0 4.9 4.9 171,238 5.7 5.6 5.3
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander 8,162 4.6 4.8 4.8 6,376 5.2 5.2 5.1
Two or more minority races 641 4.8 4.9 4.8 583 5.4 5.4 5.3
Joint 9,468 4.6 4.8 4.8 7,802 5.3 5.3 5.2
Not available 139,740 4.9 4.9 4.8 110,527 5.5 5.5 5.3
White, by ethnicty
Hispanic white 214,415 4.6 4.7 4.8 216,422 5.3 5.2 5.2
Non-Hispanic white 479,338 4.7 4.7 4.7 426,138 5.1 5.1 5.1
Sex
One male 441,919 4.8 4.8 4.8 405,414 5.3 5.3 5.3
One female 313,959 4.8 4.8 4.8 285,937 5.3 5.3 5.3
Two males 10,213 4.5 4.5 4.5 8,716 5.2 5.2 5.2
Two females 8,943 4.7 4.6 4.5 8,142 5.4 5.3 5.2
Race other than white only
American Indian or Alaska Native 10,770 4.8 4.8 4.8 9,096 5.1 5.1 5.1
Asian 25,119 4.7 4.8 4.8 25,096 4.9 5.0 5.1
Black or African American 217,351 5.0 5.0 4.9 209,910 5.4 5.3 5.2
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander 8,945 4.8 4.8 4.8 8,102 5.1 5.1 5.1
Two or more minority races 1043 4.9 4.9 4.8 815 5.2 5.3 5.2
Joint 11,815 4.7 4.8 4.8 10,958 5.0 5.1 5.1
Not available 242,666 5.0 5.0 4.8 217,915 5.3 5.3 5.1
White, by ethnicty
Hispanic white 161,713 4.8 4.8 4.8 164,748 5.1 5.1 5.1
Non-Hispanic white 733,290 4.8 4.8 4.8 668,337 5.1 5.1 5.1
Sex
One male 432,386 4.9 4.9 4.9 414,387 5.2 5.2 5.2
One female 382,071 4.9 4.9 4.9 365,368 5.2 5.2 5.2
Two males 7,937 4.8 4.8 4.8 7,276 5.0 5.0 5.0
Two females 11,208 4.8 4.8 4.8 10,646 5.1 5.1 5.0
     NOTE:  Spread-unadjusted APR is the difference between the APR on the loan and the yield on a comparable-maturity Treasury security.  Spread-adjusted APR is the 
difference between the APR on the loan and the estimated APR reported by Freddie Mac for a thirty-year fixed-rate loan in their Primary Mortgage Market Survey.  Excludes 
transition-period loans (those for which the application was submitted before 2004).  Refer also to note 1, table 11.
Unmodified 
mean spread











Modified mean spread, 




12. Mean APR spreads, unmodified and modified for borrower- and lender-related factors, for higher-priced conventional first liens on owner
occupied one- to four-family site-built homes, by type of loan and by race, ethnicity, and sex of borrower, 2005 and 2006
Percentage points except as noted
2005 2006










Race other than white only
American Indian or Alaska Native 34,646 25.9 22.2 18.2 63,757 44.7 44.8 37.7
Asian 264,397 17.0 14.5 14.8 215,172 27.7 33.2 34.6
Black or African American 553,168 31.6 27.7 21.5 883,842 44.9 46.2 38.7
Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander 29,104 23.4 20.3 17.4 47,437 36.4 41.8 37.5
Two or more minority races 3,139 20.2 18.0 17.2 5,878 40.5 42.9 37.3
Joint 57,781 13.6 17.0 14.9 74,030 34.0 40.3 34.4
Not available 611,069 24.2 23.7 18.1 1,448,614 48.0 49.6 38.3
White, by ethnicty
Hispanic white 719,166 25.4 20.3 17.5 801,813 33.5 36.6 35.8
Non-Hispanic white 3,063,436 13.1 13.1 13.1 4,343,279 30.6 30.6 30.6
Sex
One male 1,833,621 21.7 21.7 21.7 2,324,086 37.6 37.6 37.6
One female 1,334,498 21.0 20.5 20.9 1,926,089 36.1 35.0 35.9
Two males 50,505 19.2 19.2 19.2 50,870 36.5 36.5 36.5
Two females 43,322 19.5 17.4 17.7 60,185 39.5 36.8 36.1
Number of 
applications 




Modified denial rate, by 
modification factor








Modified denial rate, by 
modification factor Race, ethnicity, and sex
13. Denial rates on applications, unmodified and modified for borrower- and lender-related factors, for conventional first liens on owner-
occupied, one- to four-family, site-built homes, by type of loan and by race, ethnicity, and sex of applicant, 2006
Percent except as noted
Home purchase Refinance

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  10–14.9 27.4
  15–19.9 34.7
  20 or more 45.4
All tracts 27.0
15. Credit scores and the 
incidence of higher-priced 
lending, 2006
     Note.  Lending covers 
first-lien purchase or 
refinancing loans for site-
built homes.  Refer also to 
general note to table 14.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2006 HMDA Data -77- 2006 HMDA Data